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The Progressive Era Origins of the 
National Security Act 
Mark R. Shulman* 
Perhaps it is a universal truth that the loss of liberty at home is to 
be charged to provisions against danger; real or pretended, from 
abroad. 
-James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, May 1798' 
I. Introduction to "National Security" 
The National Security Act of 1947* and its successors drew the 
blueprint of the Cold War domestic political order. This regime 
centralized control of the military services-the Army, Navy, 
Marine Corps, and a newly separate Air Force-in a single 
executive branch department. It created a new professional 
organization to collect and analyze foreign intelligence, the Central 
Intelligence Agency. And at the center of this new national 
security apparatus, a National Security Council would eventually 
establish foreign policy by coordinating intelligence and directing 
military and para-military forces, as well as supervising a National 
Security Resources Board. The national security state would build 
a highway network crisscrossing the continent to facilitate the 
movement of troops and supplies in case of war. In the cause of 
national security, the armed forces, the intelligence apparatus, 
national resources, and even domestic transportation were drawn 
* Associate at Debevoise & Plimpton and Lecturer in Law, Columbia 
University, School of Law. B.A. Yale, 1985; M.St. Oxford, 1986; Ph.D. University 
of California, Berkeley, (history) 1990; J.D. Columbia University, 1999. The 
author is indebted to Barbara Black, Robert A. Ferguson, Keith R. Johnson, 
Edward Rhodes, and David Stebenne for their comments on various drafts of this 
article. The author invites all comments to be sent to <shulman@aya.yale.edu>. O 
1999 Mark R. Shulman. 
1. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (May 13,1798), reprinted 
in JAMES MORTON SMITH, THE REPUBLIC OF LET~ERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE 
BETWEEN THOMAS JEFFERSON AND JAMES MADISON, 1776-1826 1048 (2d ed. 1995). 
2. See National Security Act, ch. 343, title 9 101, 61 Stat. 496 (codified as 
amended at 50 U.S.C. 9 402 (1994)). 
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into the burgeoning federal government's control and coordination 
within a few short years at the start of the Cold War. For such swift 
and decisive changes, Congress drew on a plan sketched for an 
earlier crisis, nearly a generation before. 
This remarkable and unprecedented expansion of state power 
and its centralization in the executive branch has been explained in 
many ways. Yet the story would not be complete without an 
examination of its early origins in the Progressive era, specifically in 
the ideology, agenda, and activities of the National Security League 
(NSL). The NSL was a public service organization founded in 1914 
to lobby for increased and improved preparation for America's 
defense from enemies at home and abroad. This article examines 
the NSL's history and argues that the measures that formed the 
basis of the Cold War national security regime had been proposed 
long before the National Security Act of 1947. The national 
security state was built from blueprints drawn by the leaders of the 
NSL during the First World War. 
The term "national security" is somewhat ambiguous3 but 
appears traditionally to have at least three connotations: a set of 
policies, an ideology, and an outcome. To these three, this article 
contributes a fourth meaning: national security as the political 
institutionalization of an idea. Leading scholars have implied that 
the national security state sprang - like Pallas Athena - fully- 
formed in 1947 from the forehead of the Eightieth Congress. 
Historian Ernest May notes that presidents have used such words as 
"safety" and "securing" but claims that the actual term "national 
security" was not used with any frequency until after the Second 
World Before then, May contends, the words "national" and 
"security" were not intentionally used together-and certainly not 
with the same intent as one would use them today.' Likewise, 
Harold Koh dates the first use of the phrase to the post-war period. 
Koh writes that "the term 'national security' was not officially 
coined until the Cold 
3. See ARNOLD WOLFERS, DISCORD AND COLLABORATION 147 (1962) (the 
original title was "National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol"). 
4. See Ernest R. May, National Security in American History, in RETHINKING 
AMERICA'S SECURITY: BEYOND COLD WAR TO NEW WORLD ORDER 95 (Graham 
Allison & Gregory F. Treverton, eds., 1991). 
5. See id.  at 95-103. 
6. HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION 67, 74 
(1990) Nonetheless, Koh provides an important framework from understanding 
the Cold War national security constitution. For Koh's perspective on the origins, 
see id .  at 54-56. 
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And yet Yale undergraduates of the 1790s were debating the 
question, "Does the National Security depend on fostering 
Domestic ~ndustries?."' A century and a quarter later, a historian 
used the phrase precisely as we would today to rebut the 
contemporary accusation that Thomas Jefferson was a spineless 
pacifist: "Likewise the lessons of two wars with the mother-country 
had convinced many thinking men that industrial independence was 
a necessary adjunct of political independence; and even Thomas 
Jefferson, disinclined as he was to extend the functions of 
government, had come to believe that public aid of home 
manufactures might be required for national security."' The phrase 
has been used since the early days of the republic. Moreover, as we 
shall see, it was common parlance during World War I. But first 
this article examines what it signifies. 
First among its meanings, national security denotes a set of 
policies that encompass domestic security and defense against 
external threats. As "defense plus," it bolsters the traditional 
notion of defense: "Guarding or protecting from attack; resistance 
from attack; warding off of injury; protection. (The chief current 
sense)."' In lieu of "defense" one finds "security": "The condition 
of being protected from or not exposed to danger: safety" or 
"Freedom from care anxiety or apprehension; a feeling of safety or 
freedom from or absence of danger.'"' Where "defense" connotes 
sufficiency, "security" implies invulnerability. The addition of 
"national" further expands the terms' scope while defining its 
significance and application. Of the varieties of defense or security, 
that of a "nation" seems far more expansive than merely protecting 
a country's borders or even its interests. In its modern sense, 
"nation" implies not only boundaries and the machinery of the 
state, but also a people and a shared set of values. So national 
security is a broadly encompassing notion of defense against 
enemies foreign and domestic. 
Second, national security signifies an ideology based on 
"ordered liberty." Justice Benjamin Cardozo introduced that 
phrase to describe the condition that fundamental rights seek to 
7. The Yale debate is cited in WALT W. ROSTOW, HOW IT ALL BEGAN: 
OR~GINS OF THE MODERN ECONOMY 191 (1975). 
8. Victor S. Clark, The Influence of Manufactures Upon Political Sentiment in 
the United States From 1820 to 1860,22 AM. HIST. REV. 58 (1916) (based on a paper 
presented to the American Historical Association annual meeting in Washington, 
Dec. 28,1915) (emphasis added). 
9. THE COMPACT. EDITION OF THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1982 
reprint). 
10. Id. 
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protect. His Palko opinion articulated the selective adoption 
doctrine, which tests the fundamental nature of a right by asking if 
it is necessary for "the very essence of a scheme of ordered 
liberty."" Cardozo neither defines that term explicitly nor indicates 
whether the emphasis should fall on "order" or "liberty." This 
article assumes that liberty pertains to the individual, and order to 
the state-two impulses forever in tension. As such, "ordered 
liberty" signals the tension that appears when someone wants to 
strengthen the state at the expense of other individuals' freedom to 
act as they please. 
Relying on modern notions of efficiency, duty, power, and 
order, national security implies the impulse to order and embodies 
an ideology that descends from Alexander Hamilton. The first 
Secretary of the Treasury based his vision for the American 
republic on a strong central government capable of encouraging 
manufacturing and trade. Together, Americans would strive to 
build the nation's strength through industry, economy, and order.'* 
To protect far-flung interests and preserve domestic order, 
Hamilton's vision encompassed a strong navy capable of blue-water 
operations and a well-drilled army capable of providing for the 
common defense at home and abroad. A blue-water fleet was 
designed to fight on open seas, thereby taking battle away from the 
coastal defenses. Such a fleet, in combination with a professional 
army, would enable the United States to project power abroad. 
Jefferson, the first Secretary of State was constantly pitted 
against Hamilton, and their visions have contended ever since. 
Thomas Jefferson's alternative grand strategy required only 
defending port cities with a small navy of coastal vessels combined 
with well-placed fortresses. Jefferson's army was a citizen militia of 
free men dedicated to protecting their homes. The followers of 
Thomas Jefferson have long opposed Hamiltonian notions; they 
perceived the strength and moral integrity of the nation as derived 
from close ties to its agrarian, rural roots; they supported a 
minimalist government-one that would police and protect people 
and property while allowing for the greatest release of creative 
energy.13 As an ideology, national security seeks to replace 
11. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937). 
12. See, e.g., Hamilton's Report on Manufactures (1791). Hamilton "hoped to 
change an essentially agricultural nation into one with a complex, self-sufficient 
economy." JOHN A. GARRATY, THE AMERICAN NATION 155 (7th ed., 1991); see abo 
RICHARD BROOKHISER, ALEXANDER HAMILTON, AMERICAN 93-99 (1999). 
13. Mark Shulman, Institutionalizing A Political Idea: Navalism and the 
Emergence of American Sea Power, in THE POLITICS OF STRATEGIC ADJUSTMENT: 
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Jeffersonian notions of defense with Hamilton's security of 
interests. Isaiah Berlin characterized these diverging impulses as 
"negative liberty, which the individual must be allowed to enjoy 
without interference" and positive liberty, "which is an expression 
of some idea of what is good for both oneself and  other^."'^ 
National security implicitly argues that negative liberty is 
dangerously weak and myopic. Only through the ordering of 
society's resources for a common good can a great republic fulfill its 
destiny. 
In the Progressive era, Theodore Roosevelt embodied this 
Neo-Hamiltonian impulse to order society.'5 Historian John 
Morton Blum makes a telling observation in his chapter on the 
"Uses of Power" in his erudite biographical sketch, The Republican 
Roosevelt. To explain this, Blum first cites Lionel Trilling's 
assertion that "the word happiness stands at the very center" of 
liberal thought.16 He then notes that this was not so for the twenty- 
sixth president. 
It is a word which Theodore Roosevelt used rarely when 
speaking of himself and never when referring to other people. 
This was not an accident. Roosevelt concerned himself not with 
happiness but with hard work, duty, power, order. These 
conditions he valued not as prere uisites for some ultimate 9 happiness but as ends in themselves.' 
Blum goes on to observe that "Roosevelt had a good deal of 
difficulty in defining his beliefs, but manifestly he believed in power 
and in order. With power he sought to impose order; only with 
order, he contended, could there be morality."1s 
IDEAS, INSTITUTIONS, AND INTERESTS 82 (Peter Trubowitz et. al. eds., 1999); see also 
SAMUEL HUNTINGTON, THE SOLDIER AND THE STATE 270 (1964) ("The Neo- 
Harniltonians did not fall into the liberal tradition of Jefferson, [Andrew] Jackson, 
[Herbert] Spencer, and [Woodrow] Wilson. . . ."). 
14. Steven Marcus, Both Fox and Hedgehog, N. Y. TIMES, Nov. 29,1998, at 7 
(citing Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty); see also LIONEL TRILLING, THE 
LIBERAL IMAGINATION xii (1950). 
15. See HUNTINGTON, supra note 13, at 270 ("a group of statesmen and publicists 
which might be labeled Neo-Hamiltonian. The outstanding individuals in this group 
were Theodore Roosevelt, Henry Cabot Lodge, Elihu Root, Albert J. Beveridge, 
A.T. Mahan, Herbert Croly, Leonard Wood, Henry Adams, and Brooks Adams. 
The common bond among these diverse personalities was an outlook on politics 
which transcended the usual American categories."). 
16. JOHN MORTON BLUM, THE REPUBLICAN ROOSEVELT 106-07 (19.54) (citing 
TRILLING, supra note 14, at xii). 
17. Id.; see also RICHARD M. ABRAMS, CONSERVATISM IN THE PROGRESSIVE 
ERA (1964). 
18. BLUM, supra note 16, at 106-07. 
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Much like the philosophy that underlay the naval expansion 
Roosevelt helped spawn in a previous generation,Ig the agenda of 
the National Security League was far more concerned with these 
goals than with happiness. However, where navalism had the 
limited immediate political aim of creating a blue-water fleet, the 
NSL sought to re-order American civil society on a grand scale. As 
one of their own commented, the NSL's leaders intended to make 
the American people "disciplined to authority and trained to 
look . . . [for leadership in] a superior ~lass."'~ In such a country, 
there would be "no more strikes, no surly revolt against authority 
and no popular disc~ntent."~' As political scientist Samuel 
Huntington said of the Neo-Hamiltonians, "[tlhey shared with the 
military a stress on loyalty, duty, responsibility, and subordination 
of the self to the requirements of the nation. [Renowned writer and 
political scion] Brooks Adams went so far as to suggest openly that 
America would do well to substitute the values of West Point for 
the values of Wall Street."" Men such as these created the 
discourse of national security. 
Third, national security frequently signifies an outcome of 
political decisions, resources, and policies designed to shape a world 
in which the interests of a nation are protected and promoted. It is 
what a state enjoys as long as those plans and preparations succeed. 
"National security.. . implies protection, through a variety of 
means, of vital economic and political interests, the loss of which 
could threaten the fundamental values and the vitality of the 
state."= Moreover, it is usually a dynamic outcome, because the 
game continues until it is lost. It is never finally achieved and thus 
retains an aspirational element. 
Fourth and finally, this article argues that national security 
represents the political institutionalization of an idea first 
developed by the National Security League for the political 
19. See MARK RUSSELL SHULMAN, NAVALISM AND THE EMERGENCE OF 
AMERICAN SEA POWER, 1882-1893 (1995). William Leuchtenberg also links navalism 
and militarism with Progressivism's belief in a strong central government. See 
William Leuchtenberg, Progressivism and Imperialism: The Progressive Movement 
and American Foreign Policy, 1898-1916, MISS. VALLEY HIST. REV. (J. AM. HIST.) 
34 (1952); see also ROBERT H. WIEBE, SEARCH FOR ORDER, 1877-1920 (1967); SEAN 
CASHMAN, AMERICA IN THE GILDED AGE (1988). 
20. Robert D. Ward, The Origins and Activities of the National Security League, 
1914-1918, MISS. VALLEY HIST. REV. (J. OF AM. HIST.) 51, 61 (1960) (citing Amos 
Pinchot, N. Y. TIMES, Mar. 13,1917). 
21. Id. 
22. HUNTINGTON, supra note 13, at 272. 
23. AMOS A. JORDAN, ET AL, AMERICAN ATIONAL SECURITY POLICY AND 
PROCESS 3 (4th ed. 1993) (1981). 
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community of the Progressive era United States. The NSL 
formulated the concept eventually embodied in the national 
security state of the early Cold War era. Huntington describes the 
process by which ideas become institutionalized: 
Political community in a complex society thus depends upon the 
strength of the political organizations and procedures in the 
society. That strength, in turn, depends upon the scope of 
support for the organizations and procedures and their level of 
institutionalization. Scope refers simply to the extent to which 
the political organizations and procedures encompass activity in 
the society. If only a small upper-class group belongs to political 
organizations and behaves in terms of a set of procedures, the 
scope is limited. If, on the other hand, a large segment of the 
population is politically organized and follows the political 
procedures, the scope is broad. Institutions are stable, valued, 
recurring patterns of behavior. . . . Institutionalization is the 
process by which organizations and procedures acquire value 
and stability. The level of institutionalization of any political 
system can be defined by the adaptability, complexity, 
autonomy, and coherence of its organizations and procedures.24 
The NSL shaped the idea of national security and began the process 
of institutionalizing it. The idea originated in "a small upper-class 
group" but one that implicitly understood that the key to political 
change in a democracy is the institutionalization of its ideas through 
law. While these efforts seemed barren in the Progressive era, they 
eventually bore fruit in the decade following World War 11. In this 
sense, the National Security League of the World War I era framed 
the discourse of national security for the Cold War and today. 
Where the League's leaders failed to institutionalize their political 
and social agenda in the Progressive era, the national security state 
that emerged from the shadow of World War I1 achieved precisely 
that. 
11. The Rise of The National Security League 
In August 1914, Europe erupted in a war that quickly spread to 
Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. The British and German 
navies -long rivals - opened global operations against each other.25 
24. SAMUEL HUNTINGTON, POLITICAL ORDER IN CHANGING SOCIETIES 12 
(1968). 
25. See generally, PAUL M. KENNEDY, THE RISE OF ANGLO-GERMAN 
ANTAGONISM, 1860-1914 (1980) [hereinafter ANGLO-GERMAN TAGONISM]; see 
also PAUL M. KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF BRITISH NAVAL MASTERY (1976). 
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The British slapped a brutal embargo on the Central Powers, which 
retaliated with a series of measures that eventually included 
unrestricted submarine warfare in the Atlantic. Those sanctions 
threatened to sever the lifelines of all trading states. The United 
States was the wealthiest nation in the world but was increasingly 
reliant upon trade for its economic ~itality.'~ Many reasonable U.S. 
citizens fretted that its military capabilities would prove inadequate 
in the face of German aggre~sion.~' While the U.S. Navy had 
recently become the third largest in the world, America's army 
remained minuscule and poorly equipped by Continental 
standardsa Acting from these concerns, many Americans started 
to clamor for war preparation and even for intervention to forestall 
the possibility that the United States could be cut off from its 
trading partners or eventually in~aded. '~ 
In the months after August 1914, President Woodrow Wilson 
tried to maintain America's precarious neutrality in face of 
embargoes, torpedoed ships, and conflicting popular sympathies. 
In April 1917, following the resumption of unrestricted U-boat 
warfare and the revelation of a German conspiracy to open a front 
on the Mexican-American border, President Wilson finally asked 
Congress to declare war. In the year and half that followed, four 
million Americans mobilized. Two million crossed the Atlantic to 
join the Associated Powers on the western front. These troops 
provided the might that tipped the balance and brought the conflict 
to an end with the Armistice of November 11,1918. 
In December 1914, in a climate of fear and anger that 
frequently veered into panic, Wall Street lawyer Solomon 
Stanwood Menken established the National Security League as a 
non-partisan public service organization to lobby for enhanced 
American preparedness to protect against being dragged into the 
Great War or-should that fail-to win it.% While other patriotic 
26. For comparative figures on wealth in 1914, see PAULM. KENNEDY, THE RISE 
AND FALL OFTHE GREATPOWERS 243 (1987) [hereinafter GREAT POWERS]. 
27. See ALLAN R. MILLE~T & PETER MASLOWSKI, FOR THE COMMON DEFENSE 
338-339 (2d ed. 1994). 
28. See KENNEDY, GREAT POWERS, supra note 26, at 247-48. Note also 
Kennedy's evaluation of the strategic situation: "The United States was immensely 
secure." 
29. See M I L L E ~  & MASLOWSKI, supra note 27, at 338 ("American 
internationalists. . . formed a complex network of preparedness lobbies and began 
propaganda programs in order to build support for increased military spending."). 
30. Much of the information on the NSL in this article is based on U.S. House of 
Representatives, Hearing Before a Special Committee of the House of 
Representatives, Sixty-Fifih Congress, Third Session on H. Res. 469 and H. Res. 476 
To Investigate and Make Report as to the Oficers, Membership, Financial Support, 
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groups coalesced around sympathies for either side in the war or a 
specific program (such as pro-German or British, for universal 
military training or pacifism), the NSL was organized around a new 
theory of defense.31 Historian John Chambers credits the creation 
of the organization to Rep. Augustus P. Gardner of Massachusetts, 
a son-in-law of Henry Cabot Lodge. He sees Menken as a 
"nominal head" and reports that former Secretary of War Elihu 
Root privately referred to him as a "good-natured chuckle-head."32 
No doubt the influence of Gardner, Root and other wise men was 
considerable when they applied it, but they did not create the 
organization so much as provide prestigious names, speeches, and 
Expenditures, General Character, Activities, and Purposes of the National Security 
League, A Corporation of New York, and of any Associated Organizations, 65 Cong. 
(1918) [hereinafter Hearing Before]. 
31. See JOHN WH~~ECLAY CHAMBERS 11, TO RAISE AN ARMY: THE DRAFT 
COMES TO MODERN AMERICA 81 (1987). The historical literature on the NSL is 
scant and sometimes surprising. See Ward, supra note 20, a tentative but competent 
study; GEORGE T. BLAKELY, HISTORIANS ON THE HOMEFRONT: AMERICAN 
PROPAGANDA FOR THE GREAT WAR (1970), a more polemical work that seems to 
argue that the historians and other propagandists were acting immorally or at least 
hypocritically by using their professional skills to support the war effort; DAVID 
KENNEDY, OVER HERE: THE FIRST WORLD WAR AND AMERICAN SOCIETY 31 
(1980), an invaluable book for many more reasons than its few comments on the 
NSL, and JOHN CARVER EDWARDS, PATRIOTS IN PINSTRIPE: MEN OF THE NATIONAL 
SECURITY LEAGUE (1982), an extensive treatment of some of the NSL's personalities 
and programs, which argues that the League was not particularly influential in its 
day. Allan R. Millett's vast biography of subsequent League president Robert Lee 
Bullard mentions the NSL only briefly. See ALLAN R.  MILLET^, THE GENERAL: 
ROBERT LEE BULLARD AND OFFICERSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES ARMY, 1881-1925 
(1975). 
For more on preparedness in general, see JOHN PATRICK FINNEGAN, AGAINST 
THE SPECTER OF A DRAGON: THE CAMPAIGN FOR MILITARY PREPAREDNESS, 1914- 
1917 (1974) and MICHAEL PEARLMAN, TO MAKE DEMOCRACY SAFE FOR 
AMERICA: PATRICIANS AND PREPAREDNESS IN THE PROGRESSIVE RA (1984). The 
former work is a straightforward account of the organizations and individuals that 
comprised the campaign and closes in 1917. For all the strengths of the latter 
book, Pearlman intentionally emphasizes the social reform aspects of the 
preparedness movement while acknowledging the defense roles as critical to its 
platform. He paints a picture of a movement in which some of the leaders aspired 
mostly to make the republic safe for elites. This work also includes several highly 
idiosyncratic observations about capitalism and communism as well as too many 
factual mistakes to make it a completely credible source. I do not know of any 
work that refers to the naming of the League. 
Primary sources for the League have been scattered or destroyed. Bullard 
destroyed many of them in the 1930's and early 1940's, apparently for lack of 
storage space and a belief that the League had already become insignificant. See 
Robert Lee Bullard, Robert Lee Bullard Papers (unpublished materials on file 
with the Library of Congress, Manuscripts Division). This article has been built 
upon the foundations of the secondary works as well as the Congressional reports 
and personal collections cited throughout. 
32. CHAMBERS, supra note 31, at 81, 302 n.19. 
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sometimes access to financial resources. From 1914 until 1918, 
Menken gave the NSL the initial drive and daily leadership that 
continuously shaped both the organization and the public's 
perceptions of its significance. Immediately after the war, Menken 
lost control of the League after a U.S. House of Representatives 
special sub-committee concluded that it had made improper 
contributions to political campaigns.33 At that point, the League 
wandered off of the path it had followed for four years. 
Menken and his colleagues built the NSL on a platform that 
integrated a strong, almost aggressive defense policy with a panoply 
of domestic security measures. For several years the NSL 
developed these notions and worked to institutionalize them 
through political and educational means. It was led by the 
generation's elite-bankers, lawyers, business leaders, and 
statesman. Within months, the League claimed tens of thousands 
of followers across the land. To institutionalize its platform, the 
League's leaders organized countless rallies, published pamphlets, 
engineered education programs, and even shaped political 
campaigns. By 1918, its national security agenda had become part 
of the American political dialogue. 
A. Origins of the League: 1914-1 915 
Menken had been in Europe on business at the outbreak of 
war. He had witnessed French mobilization in July and then the 
chaos of London in August. He observed the financial and 
domestic problems that arose in countries that had been 
anticipating war for years." Watching a rancorous debate in the 
House of Commons, Menken resolved to do everything possible to 
minimize the danger of chaos in his own country. He returned to 
New York determined to establish an organization that would help 
the government prepare for war or preferably, prevent of it. The 
New York Tribune happily reported the establishment of such a 
group: 
Why should we not defend ourselves? The National Security 
League is the expression of a growing conviction the country 
over. That conviction abates not one jot from our resolve for 
peace, for our national aversion to militarism and all its works. 
33. This episode will be discussed infra. 
34. For the role of arms races and the coming of war in Europe, see KENNEDY, 
ANGLO-GERMAN TAGONISM, supra note 25, DAVID HERRMANN, THE ARMING 
OF EUROPE AND THE MAKING OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR (1996), and JAMES JOLL, 
THE ORIGINS OFTHE FIRST WORLD WAR (1984). 
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It postulates our national duty to labor for disarmament and an 
international agreement establishing a world peace, if such a 
plan can be devised by the mind of man. But it insists, in the 
meantime, upon a little plain, common sense and precaution. It 
insists that we shall not now cast aside all weapons because we 
hope some day to make their use impossible.35 
Menken turned for support first to publishing giant George H. 
Putnam. Together, Menken and Putnam set out to establish a 
nonpartisan group of leading citizens who could impartially help 
guide public opinion to a sensible or "scientific" understanding of 
the war and the relation of the United States to it. This reliance 
upon so-called experts was to  remain a cornerstone of the national 
security agenda-one heavily influenced by Progressive era notions 
of expertise and professionalism. 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, foreign policy 
expertise was divided among three disparate groups. First were the 
career diplomats in the embassies and consulates along with a small 
coterie of civil servants working in the old State, War and Navy 
office building. Second were the few statesmen who served in 
government only as an adjunct to their "real" careers. In his 
typically idiosyncratic way of referring to himself in the third 
person, Henry Adams compared these statesmen to the career 
officers: 
With [Secretary of State John] Hay's politics, at home or 
abroad, Adams had nothing whatever to do. Hay belonged to 
the New York school, like [iron-monger and politician] Abram 
Hewitt, [leader of the bar, and former Attorney General and 
Secretary of State William] Evarts, [industrialist and former 
Secretary of Navy] W. C. Whitney, [lawyer and former 
Governor of New York] Samuel J. Tilden-men who played the 
game for ambition or amusement, and played, as a rule, much 
better than the professionals, but whose aims were considerably 
larger than those of the usual player.36 
35. N. Y. TRIB., Dec. 3,1914. 
36. HENRY ADAMS, 2 THE EDUCATION OF HENRY ADAMS 155 (Time Inc. ed. 
1964) (1918) (writing about 1898-1899). Hay had served as President Lincoln's 
private secretary, as Assistant Secretary of State under Evarts (1879-81) and as 
Secretary of State under Presidents McKinley and Roosevelt (1899-1905). Evarts 
had been President Johnson's chief defense counsel in the Senate impeachment trial 
and subsequently his Attorney General; he was Secretary of State under President 
Harrison. Whitney was an industrialist and corporate lawyer who served as 
Secretary of the Navy under President Cleveland. Tilden achieved his greatest 
successes as the reformer who broke William "Boss" Tweed's Ring in New York 
City, but he was also served a term as governor of New York and most famously lost 
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Third were the professional military officers, who expounded a 
variety of Neo-Hamiltonian principles about how to prepare for 
and fight wars." These officers helped create the modern 
professional military education institutions that produced virtually 
all uniformed defense intellectuals in the early twentieth century: 
the Naval Institute (1874); the Army Infantry and Cavalry School 
(1881, later the Command and General Staff College); the Naval 
War College (1884); and the Army War College (1901). Only with 
the expansion of the national security apparatus after 1947 would a 
critical mass of civilians also make careers as professional military 
analysts in these institutions or the think tanks that emerged to 
support the rapidly growing military-industrial complex.38 In 1914, 
few civilians were truly expert in both foreign and military affairs. 
To add instant credibility to the NSL's claim of expertise and 
authority, Putnam suggested that Menken ask Joseph H. Choate to 
serve as honorary president.39 Choate was a leading lawyer who 
the "Stolen Election of 1876" to Rutherford B. Hayes. 
37. See HUNTINGTON, supra note 13, at 270-88. 
38. In 1994-95, the author worked in a Washington, DC think tank, the 
National Strategy Information Center. In 1995-96 he served as a professor of 
military history at the U.S. Air War College, founded when the independent Air 
Force was created in 1947. 
39. The NSL had five presidents and numerous honorary presidents. Robert 
Bacon (1860-1919) served as the first president from January 1915 until May 1917, 
while Menken was Executive Director. Menken (1870-1954) then served as 
president until June 1918 and again from November 1921 until February 1925. 
Honorary President Choate (1832-1917) was probably the nation's leading trial 
lawyer and had served as Ambassador to Great Britain. Bacon, a banker and 
partner at J.P. Morgan, had been Assistant Secretary of State, then briefly Secretary 
after Elihu Root went to the Senate. He was then ambassador extraordinary and 
plenipotentiary to France from 1909 to 1912. After the U.S. declared war, he joined 
the Army Reserves and served on Pershing's American Expeditionary Force staff in 
France. He was a leader of the preparedness movement and a founder of the 
Plattsburg training camps. In the late 1870's, Bacon had been Theodore Roosevelt's 
idol and friend at Harvard. See H.W. BRANDS, THEODORE ROOSEVELT: THE LAST 
ROMANTIC 61 (1997) ("[tlhe biggest man on campus during Roosevelt's time was 
Robert Bacon, who captained the football team, took top track honors, captured the 
heavyweight boxing crown and pulled an oar on the crew. And he was good-looking 
and congenial to boot."). 
Honorary President Parker (1852-1926) had been Chief Justice of the New 
York Court of Appeals before resigning to accept the Democratic nomination for 
President in 1904. Unsuccessful running against Theodore Roosevelt, he returned 
to law practice in New York City. Honorary President Root (1845-1937) was one 
of the leading corporate lawyers and public servants of his day, serving as U.S. 
Attorney for Southern District of New York, Secretary of War and of State, U.S. 
Senator, ambassador, President of the Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, and chairman of the Republican National Committee; in 1912 he was 
awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his work to improve international arbitration. 
Charles Lydecker (1851-1920) was a lawyer and New York State national 
Heinonline - -  104 Dick. L. Rev. 300 1999-2000 
had served as Ambassador to the Court of St. James's and then to 
the International Peace Conference at The Hague in 1907. To 
balance this Republican stalwart, he invited the Democratic 
presidential candidate of 1904, Judge Alton B. Parker, to serve as 
an honorary vice president. Parker agreed to serve only after the 
personal intervention of Secretary of War Lindley M. Garrison. 
Former President William Howard Taft, on the other hand, refused 
all entreaties to serve as an honorary vice president, contending 
that the League would only foster militarism and undermine the 
cause of international arbitrati~n.~' Taft called the League's 
founders the "clubs and smart set."41 
Balancing constituencies and expertise, Menken relied heavily 
on George H. Putnam, a fascinating character who contributed 
money, experience, and contacts to the organization. Son of 
George P. Putnam, founder of the eponymous New York 
publishing house, he was born in London while his parents were on 
a business trip in 1844. Despite his relative youth, the son served 
with distinction in the 176th New York Volunteers during the Civil 
War, rising to the rank of major. During the Civil War, soldiers 
could vote before their twenty-first birthday, so in November 1864 
young Putnam cast the first of his many Republican ballots. Later 
he played important roles in the reform movements of the party, 
first as a and then in Roosevelt's Progressive faction. 
After the Civil War he turned to the family business, not only 
attending to editing and publishing but also becoming a driving 
force for the development of international intellectual property law. 
In these pursuits and for pleasure, he made some three score round 
trips across the Atlantic, mostly to Great Britain. For his 
achievements in publishing as well as his work to stem literary 
piracy, the University of Oxford awarded him an honorary 
guard officer who served in 1918-19. Charles D. Orth served briefly after the war. 
The Congressional investigation cast Orth's role in an unfavorable light, as he was 
responsible for the "loyalty" tests that initially drew its ire. He was, in short, 
directly responsible for the disintegration of the League, starting with the 
resignation of Root on December 7, 1918. Orth served until November 21, 1921, 
at which point Menken returned. 
Finally, Lt. Gen. Robert Lee Bullard served from February 1925 until he 
closed the organization's doors for the last time on the first of July 1942. 
40. For appointments, see EDWARDS, supra note 31, at 6-7. 
41. Mark R. Shulman, Navalists, Realists, and the Defining of National Security, 
1877-1947,6 VALLEY FORGE J. 112 (1992). 
42. The Mugwumps were a group of progressive Republicans who deserted the 
G.O.P. presidential nominee (James G. Blaine) to vote for the reform-minded 
governor of New York, Democrat Grover Cleveland, in 1884. The fragile coalition 
had fallen apart by 1888. 
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doctorate of law and letters. At the opening of the hostilities in 
1914, Putnam's ties with Great Britain were deep, and the guns of 
August rattled him to the core. By December 1914 he had already 
been denouncing the German violation of Belgian neutrality and 
labeling it a causus bellum for several months. Moreover, he 
claimed that the "Hun's" eventual intent was to conquer the United 
States.43 
With such eminent leadership, the League immediately won 
the support of other prominent citizens. Reporting the first NSL 
meeting, the New York Sun headline noted: "Demand Inquiry into 
Defenses of Nation-150 Well Known Men of Affairs Start 
National Security League ~ovement."" The list soon included 
eminent authors, historians, bankers, and lawyers.45 Within a year, 
the national committee of 47 luminaries included university 
presidents, financiers, and seven former cabinet secretaries, as well 
as Thomas A. Edison, Theodore Roosevelt, and the governors of 
fourteen states.46 While most of those from outside New York were 
merely window-dressing, they did represent the best and the 
brightest and the NSL's hope for broader political backing4' 
Widespread and prestigious support was crucial for 
institutionalizing their ideas. The initial organization included 
three committees led by distinguished and capable citizens: former 
43. For general biographical material, see the obituaries in the N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
28, 1930, LIVERPOOL POST AND MERCURY ORBIT, Feb. 28, 1930, and COMMON 
SPEECH v. 11, no., 5, Mar. 1930 (the newspaper of the English Speaking Union, of 
which Putnam was a longtime vice president). For Putnarn's notions about the 
possibility of a German invasion, see the N.Y. EVENING POST, Dec. 2, 1914, and the 
N.Y. TRIB., Dec. 3, 1914. The English Speaking League itself provides yet another 
piece of the puzzle explaining the smooth transition of hegemony from Britain to the 
United States. Menken was also an Anglophile and believed there ought to be some 
variety of an Anglo-American naval alliance. See Hearing Before, supra note 30, at 
370. 
44. N.Y. SUN, Dec. 2,1914, at 1. 
45. National Security League flyer (Jan. 8, 1915) (unpublished material on file 
with Harvard University Library, Albert Bushnell Hart Papers). The original list 
included Hart, William H. Cozzens, Frederic Coudert, Richard Harding Davis, 
Charles S. Davison, Robert C.  Morris, George E. Roosevelt, Herbert Saterlee, and 
Edward R. Stettinius. See id. 
46. See id. The university presidents were James B. Angel1 of the University of 
Michigan and James Grier Hibben of Princeton; financiers included scions A.J. 
Drexel Biddle and George Wharton Pepper of Pennsylvania; former secretaries of 
Navy, Charles J. Bonaparte and George von L. Meyer; of War, Henry L. Stimson, 
Jacob Dickinson and Luke Wright, of Labor and Commerce, Oscar L. Strauss, and 
of State Philander C. Knox. See id. 
47. See Announcement of the National Security Congress, Washington, January 
20-22, (1916) (unpublished material on file with Hapard University Library, Albert 
Bushnell Hart Papers). 
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Secretary of War Henry Stimson, Scientific American editor J .  
Bernard Walker, and Lyman Abbott, the estimable editor of The 
Outlook." Although these men evidently shared some core belief 
about preparedness and the need for universal military training, 
there was no consensus about the role legal frameworks could play 
in the effort to create or maintain international peace. For 
example, between 1905 and 1909, Root, Bacon, and Abbott had 
worked toward the creation of a permanent World Court and for 
international arbitration, while Roosevelt and others believed that 
force rather than arbitration or the law alone guaranteed peace and 
security. While Roosevelt was opposing internationalist move- 
ments of all stripes, Root wrote to trusted Wilson aide and 
confident Edward House that "At the basis of every community lies 
the idea of an organization to preserve peace. Without that idea 
really active and controlling there can be no community of 
individuals or nation."49 
Within the National Security League, Solomon Stanwood 
Menken was the force behind the nominal leaders. He was born in 
Tennessee in 1879 and moved to New York as a youth, he attended 
City College and Cornell, eventually taking an LL.B. from 
Columbia Law School. Although he was descended from an old 
Jewish family, young Menken converted to Christianity, started 
going by the name Stanwood, and married an upper-class gentile. 
He quickly became a successful corporate lawyer whose clients 
48. See EDWARDS, supra note 31, at 8-9. Walker's assistants were the navalist 
historian Robert W. Neeser and former Assistant Secretary of the Navy Beekman 
Winthrop. See also Walker's navalist tract of earlier that year: THE UNITED STATES 
NAVY: ITS PRESENT STANDING AND NEEDED INCREASE (1914). Abbott (1835-1922) 
was a publisher, Congregational minister, and one-time pacifist. As editor of The 
Outlook, he had been Roosevelt's only boss in the private sector when the former 
president joined the magazine's staff after touring Africa and Europe in 1909 and 
1910. 
49. See Letter from Elihu Root to Col. Edward House (Aug. 16, 1918) 
(unpublished material on file with the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, 
Elihu Root Papers); see also Letter from Nicholas Murray Butler to Theodore 
Roosevelt (Dec. 5,  1906) (unpublished material on file with Columbia University, 
Manuscripts and Rare Books Library, Nicholas Murray Butler Papers) regarding his 
establishment of the American branch of the Association for International 
Conciliation with a council to include Root, and Abbott among many prominent 
citizens. Roosevelt's response is not available, but he won the Nobel Peace Prize 
shortly thereafter and made perfectly clear to his friend Butler that the money was 
going towards "industrial peace" not "international peace." Letter from Theodore 
Roosevelt to Nicholas Murray Butler (Dec. 12, 1906) (unpublished material on file 
with Columbia University, Manuscripts and Rare Books Library, Nicholas Murray 
Butler Papers). Butler also worked with the NSL, in its efforts to spread propaganda 
in Latin America. See EDWARDS, supra note 31, at 53. For the World Court efforts, 
see PEARLMAN, supra note 31, at 122. 
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included Henry Fisk and J.P. Morgan. Despite his practice (or 
perhaps because of it), Menken maintained a life-long ambiguity 
about capitalism. He was a zealous reformer. He helped found the 
city's Reform Club and supported the single tax movement led by 
Henry George." He even ran for local New York office on a single- 
tax ticket in 1896. This movement advocated a reordering of 
taxation based on one measure of wealth-land. Menken took his 
compulsion for order into a myriad of passions. He even favored 
creating some trusts. Through much of his adult life, he was also a 
dedicated member of the Democratic Party, raising funds and 
organizing city politics. It was only in 1912 that he started to 
support the reform-oriented Progressives, including Roosevelt and 
Robert M. LaFollette of Wisconsin. Even then he remained partial 
to the Democratic Party, an affinity that soon caused a Republican 
faction of the NSL to splinter off into its own group- the American 
Defense Society. 
B. The League: 1915-1 919 
While the NSL established chapters around the country, its 
greatest support came from residents of New York City. Between 
1915 and 1919, some 94% of all contributions over $200 came from 
the New York area." The NSL got a good part of its financial 
backing from the wealthy and mighty: corporate lawyer Elihu Root, 
oil titan John D. Rockefeller, Jr., Arthur C. James of Phelps Dodge, 
banker J.P. Morgan, financier Jacob Schiff, and T. Coleman du 
50. Much of this biographical information on Menken comes from EDWARDS, 
supra note 31, at 2-3 and PEARLMAN, supra note 31, at 138-139. For Henry George 
and reform, see Ronald William Yanosky, Seeing the Cat: Henry George and the rise 
of the Single Tax Movement, 1879-1890 (1993) (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation) (on 
file with the University of California, Berkeley). Henry George, author of the 
highly-popular work on political economy POVERTY AND PROGRESS, led a 
movement to move to a single-tax system based on the notion that all wealth was 
derived from ownership of land, and consequently, the state should have the 
authority and obligation to tax land tenure very heavily. In 1886's mayoral race, 
George came in second behind Abram Hewitt but ahead of the Republican reform 
candidate, twenty-eight year old Theodore Roosevelt. It seems that some 15,000 
GOP voters defected to the Democrat Hewitt in order to thwart George. The 1896- 
97 campaign was George's second try, running on the "Democracy of Jefferson" 
ticket, an anti-Tammany, anti-Bryan fusion. George died several days before the 
election, apparently defusing the entire issue in New York. For the 1886 campaign, 
see EDMUND MORRIS, THE RISE OFTHEODORE ROOSEVELT 356-57 (1979). 
51. For a discussion of the contributions, see Hearing Before, supra note 30 
(note especially page 883); see also CHAMBERS, supra note 31, at 82, 303 n.21. 
Feeding post-war revisionist attacks on the "merchants of death," the investigative 
committee discovered that munitions makers like du Pont and Maxim had 
contributed to the NSL's coffers. 
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Pont, an heir to the chemical company. Like the majority of New 
Yorkers in this era, NSL supporters and leaders had been born and 
bred in many places. Menken was from Tennessee, his successor 
Robert Lee Bullard was from Alabama. Honorary Presidents 
Choate and Robert Bacon had been born in Massachusetts, Alton 
B. Parker and Elihu Root in upstate New York. Putnam was born 
in London. While most NSL leaders and supporters lived in New 
York, at the time so did approximately 10% of the nation-and a 
much higher percentage of those who wielded capital. 
The NSL grew rapidly even after the Republicans-only 
American Defense Society split off in the late summer of 1915. By 
mid-1916 the NSL had some 50,000 members nationally, organized 
into 155 branches in 42 states. By the end of the year, membership 
had doubled, with 250 chapters and 100,000 members." Until the 
Armistice nearly two years later, the numbers remained high. Few 
official records remain from the League, and a complete catalogue 
of its activities is nowhere to be found. Nonetheless, we do know 
that it organized hundreds of rallies around the nation. Lyman 
Abbott chaired the Committee on Extension, the regional branches 
bureau. Harvard Professor Albert Bushnell Hart led the League's 
outreach programs as educational director of the NSL's Committee 
on Patriotism through Education. This section undertook the bulk 
of the League's propaganda work, sending speakers, writers, and 
handbooks to hundreds of thousands of Americans at meeting 
halls, street corners, and open-air a~semblies.'~ 
C. The National Security Agenda 
Wielding historical analogies, social Darwinist theory, and a 
brand of economics particular to the era, the League's theorists 
argued for a bolstered defense virtually unprecedented in the 
American experience. Its leaders devised a nationalist agenda that 
provided for a strong defense against enemies of the state at home 
and abroad. Enemies included all those who were not "100% 
American," eventually meaning not only foreign nationals, 
pacifists, many immigrants, and political radicals,'* but also trade 
52. For membership numbers, see CHAMBERS, supra note 31, at 81. 
53. See NATIONAL SECURITY LEAGUE, AMERICA T WAR: A HANDBOOK OF
PATRIOTIC EDUCATION REFERENCES (Albert Busbnell Hart ed. 1918); see also 
NATIONAL SECURITY LEAGUE, THE HANDBOOK OF THE WAR FOR READERS, 
SPEAKERS, AND TEACHERS (Albert Bushnell Hart & Arthur 0. Lovejoy eds., 2d ed., 
1918) (1917). 
54. See Diary entry of Robert Lee Bullard, Robert Lee Bullard Papers (Dec. 
27,1926) (unpublished materials on file with the Library of Congress, Manuscripts 
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union members, Congressmen who voted against critical pieces of 
legislation, and even the people of Wisconsin. To illustrate the 
complexity of the NSL7s agenda, it is worth introducing one of the 
League's leading thinkers, historian Albert Bushnell Hart. After 
that, this article will explicitly address the NSL7s positions on 
economics, defense, and citizenship. 
1. The Historian-"The Grand Old Man of American 
History," Harvard Professor Hart provided a depth of historical 
understanding and cultural context that grounded the NSL in some 
of the nation's finest political traditions." A believer in the liberty 
Berlin later labeled "positive," Hart strove for several years to 
ensure that the League's effort strengthened security without 
endangering Jeffersonian liberty. Hart had taught W.E.B. DuBois 
and was later elected a trustee of Howard University. He worked 
to support the causes of Armenians and Jews abroad. Within the 
League, however, he lost out to those who preferred the Neo- 
Hamiltonian vision of the strong state-one that paid less attention 
to individuals' claims against the society and the state. Hart's 
histories were all of the patriotic stripe that dominated the 
profession in the Progressive era. As with most of his 
contemporaries,56 he wrote a brand of teleological history that 
sought to explain and celebrate American exceptionalism and 
greatness. He saw its origins in the British system and felt a great 
affinity with that nation. Though he was sometimes accused of 
selling out his professional perspective to the war effort, Hart 
supported patriotic causes because his studies led him to believe 
them right and just. 
Division, Robert Lee Bullard Papers). 
55. See Samuel Eliot Morison, A Memoir and Estimate of Albert Bushnell 
Hart, MASS. HIST. SOC. PROC. 28-52 (1966) (unpublished material on file with 
Harvard University Library). Twice a winner of the Pulitzer Prize and official 
historian of Harvard University, Morison (1887-1976) had been Hart's teaching 
assistant, starting in the fall of 1910. 
56. And yet Hart was often alone among his white colleagues in recounting the 
indignities that the dominant white American culture inflicted upon African- 
Americans among others. Hart's support of W.E.B. DuBois is found in various 
writings. After the war, Hart left his home on Harvard's history department mostly 
because he did not get along with his colleague Archibald Cary Coolidge (founding 
editor of Foreign Affairs). Hart moved to the new department of political science as 
the Eaton Professor of Government. The NSL was not Hart's first effort at creating 
an organization to promote the influence of professionals. Long after leading the 
American Historical Association, Hart presided over the American Political Science 
Association. He died in 1943. Much of this biographical information comes from 
Morison, supra note 55, at 28-52. 
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Ironically, when war broke out, several of hysterical jingoists 
mislabeled Hart a friend of Prussianized Germany. Given Hart's 
writings throughout this period, such accusations seem misguided at 
best. Nonetheless, in December 1918 an agent in the Department 
of Justice's Bureau of Investigation (precursor of the FBI) released 
a list of Americans in sympathy with Germany. Hart's name was 
among them. Indeed he had studied in Germany and retained 
many deep friendships with Germans. He was on the verge of 
accepting a one-year visiting professorship in Berlin when war 
intervened. Yet for Hart there was no contest. The British had 
sewn the seeds that germinated in the United States. He viewed 
their political and cultural institutions as parents or older siblings of 
America's. With the help of some influential fellow Harvard 
alumni (including Roosevelt and Lodge) and the NSL, he was able 
to squash the spurious rumor that he was pro-German.57 The new 
Bureau's ability to blacklist subversives had limits. 
In the 32 months preceding the American entry into the war, 
Hart was probably the educator most prolific and influential in the 
preparedness movement. Even after April 1917, Hart's rhetoric 
was high and his patriotism keen. However, by that point some of 
the League's leaders had turned to a more military brand of 
nationalism that contravened Hart's respect for propriety, human 
dignity, and positive liberty. 
57. Hart's defense rushed to Washington in a flurry of letters and telegrams 
from Lodge, Roosevelt, the governor of Illinois, a federal judge, J. Franklin Jameson, 
Charles Lydecker, Henry West, and Joseph Choate. See Morison, supra note 55; 
Albert Bushnell Hart, Trail of the German (unpublished material on file with 
Harvard University Library, Albert Bushnell Hart Papers); Letter from David Starr 
Jordan to Sen. Lee Slater Overman, Chair, Special Investigative Committee 
(December 23,1918) (unpublished material on file with Harvard University Library, 
Albert Bushnell Hart Papers); Letter from J. Franklin Jameson to Albert Bushnell 
Hart (unpublished material on file with the Library of Congress, Manuscript 
Division, Jameson Correspondence). Hart's persecutor, Henry Bielaski, had already 
encouraged a semi-official vigilantism in the creation of the American Protective 
League in the spring of 1917. See KENNEDY, OVER HERE, supra note 31, at 81; see 
also Annual Report of the Attorney General of the United States for the Year 18 
(1918). 
Hart had been Roosevelt's classmate at Harvard College. Lodge had 
graduated several years earlier; he had received one of the first history Ph.D.'s 
from Harvard in 1876 as a student of Henry Adams. Lodge then spent a couple of 
years teaching in the history department, departing in 1879 and creating a gap in 
the department subsequently filled by Hart. See Morison supra note 55; see also 
WILLIAM C. WIDENOR, HENRY CABOT LODGE AND THE SEARCH FOR AN 
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 1, 11 (1980). Widenor provides a sophisticated 
treatment of Lodge's views on the uses of history and the Hamilton-Jefferson 
debates in chapter 1, The Attractions and Uses of History. 
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In 1918 Hart helped Menken rein in the egregious Robert 
McNutt McElroy, a Princeton historian who was preaching hyper- 
Americanism for the NSL across the country. At the end of one of 
the NSL's "Preparedness Parades," McElroy and others addressed 
the University of Wisconsin's cadet regiment after it had marched 
in wool uniforms through a driving r a in~ to rm.~~  The tent in which 
McElroy spoke had inadequate acoustics. The prominent attorney, 
John M. Olin, sitting twenty feet away, could not hear McElroy's 
long harangue.59 Piqued by the cadets' inattention to his ranting, 
McElroy grew increasingly impatient as he spoke. He accused the 
regiment and assembled faculty of treason, but there was no 
response. No one could hear him. Perhaps to test if they were 
listening-or possibly because he believed it-McElroy then 
widened the accusation, branding as treasonous not only the state's 
Chief Justice (who was in attendance but could not hear) but the 
entire population of that heavily German-American state.60 
McElroy's outrage signaled the beginning of the end of the 
NSL's national aspirations. National press coverage labeled it an 
outrageous and inflammatory organization of East Coast 
xenophobes. While some NSL leaders were fanatical about their 
cause, they usually tempered their fervor, couching it in mainstream 
terms acceptable not only to the nominal leaders like Root and 
58. The NSL started these parades in the spring of 1916, see CHAMBERS, supra 
note 31, at 120. 
59. See Letter from John M. Olin to Charles R. Van Hise (May 2, 1918) 
(unpublished material on file with Columbia University, Columbia University 
Teacher's College Manuscripts Collection). 
60. The McElroy/Wisconsin flap contains fodder for several articles. See, e.g., 
John Bradley Winslow (Chief Justice, Wisconsin State Supreme Court), Charles R. 
Van Hise (President of the University of Wisconsin), & E. A. Birge (Dean of the 
College of Letters and Science), Report upon Statements of Professor Robert McNutt 
McElroy and the Executive Committee of the National Security League Relating to the 
University of Wisconsin (Madison: University of Wisconsin, n.d. (1918)). McElroy's 
diatribe started at the Madison Agricultural Pavilion on April 6, 1918, and was 
amplified in an NSL pamphlet dated April 15, 1918, the April 18, 1918 NEW YORK 
TRIBUNE, and then in the CHICAGO TRIBUNE, May 13, 1918. For Hart's reaction to 
the ruckus, see Letter from Frederick L. Paxson to Albert Bushnell Hart (April 22, 
1918) (unpublished material on file with Haward University Library, Albert 
Bushnell Hart Papers); Letter from Albert Bushnell Hart to Carl Russell Fish, (April 
22, 1918) (unpublished material on file with Haward University Library, Albert 
Bushnell Hart Papers). The story is also told in EDWARDS, supra note 31, at 99-110. 
For more on the anti-German-American hysteria, see DANIEL PATRICK 
MOYNIHAN, SECRECY (1998). A sociologist (and statesman), Moynihan makes 
much of the role of ethnic diversity in shaping American paranoia and xenophobia 
that led to the infamous Sedition (1917) and Espionage (1918) acts. See id.; see 
also Mark R. Shulman, Secrecy, U.S. NAVAL INST. PROC. July 1999, at 100 (book 
review). It was this sort of reaction that Hart unsuccessfully sought to avoid. 
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Roosevelt but also to a larger cut of the general population. It was 
this line of fanaticism verging on paranoia that McElroy crossed, 
and that Hart strove to keep the NSL from crossing. The tendency 
among some members to breach it only grew more pronounced 
with the Armistice and Menken's resignation. 
2. Economics-In its heyday, the League demanded that 
more of the economy be centralized, in the hands of either reliable 
cartels or the government. Somehow this was presumed to be 
different from loathsome communism, perhaps because the desired 
goals were power and efficiency, not the well-being of the less 
privileged. The NSL sought to increase efficiency and security 
while avoiding issues of distributional justice. To centralize the 
economy, Menken advocated high tariffs and higher taxes to fund 
the expanding federal government.61 He had favored the creation 
of a Federal Reserve when most professional experts did not.62 The 
pursuit of order led the NSL to call for the creation of cartels to 
produce and deliver certain essential goods and services. Menken 
focused on three: "the milk business in New York City. We ought 
to have one milk company. . . . [and] I think the coal business ought 
to be consolidated. I think there would be great value in 
consolidating electric lines. Competition between electric com- 
panies is always wasteful."63 
The unrestricted right to private property provided one of the 
cornerstones of the League's agenda; to some, trade unions were as 
menacing as U-boats. When the Peace of Paris relieved the nation 
of any plausible military threat, this right .was virtually all that 
remained of the League's agenda. In the summer of 1919, the NSL 
leadership appears to have decided that untrammeled property 
rights formed the proper basis of American society. Still trying to 
moderate the excesses of his reactionary colleagues, Hart quickly 
put the League on notice. "What is the matter with the National 
Security League?" he wrote Menken.@ "I am completely at a loss 
to understand some recent developments. I have written a letter of 
protest against Colonel Lydecker's proposed campaign to induce 
the American people to believe that the ownership of property is 
the foundation of the Republic. No society, no party, no public 
- 
61. See Hearing Before, supra note 30, at 481. 
62. See id. at 478. 
63. Id. at 481. 
64. Letter from Albert Bushnell Hart to S. Stanwood Menken (Sep. 27, 1919) 
(unpublished material on file with Harvard University Library, Albert Bushnell 
Hart Papers). 
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body could possibly stand up under that b~rden."~ '  He repeated 
this argument in a letter to Charles Orth, who was then leading the 
League towards advocating an increasingly authoritarian domestic 
regime. "As a matter of fact no progress can be made in this 
country which does not recognize the labor unions as a form of 
organization which has come to stay, which needs restriction and 
common sense, but cannot be gotten rid of."66 The League's 
responses go unrecorded, but Hart was clearly unhappy with the 
excesses the League had been driving toward since the Armistice. 
In the end, Hart lost, the NSL fought unions on the ground that 
they were "communistic."67 Stripped of its defense rationale, the 
National Security League agenda was left with anti-unionism and 
anti-communism. 
3. Defense-During the war, the most critical contradictions 
in the NSL agenda were revealed in the debate over militarism. 
While all NSL leaders believed in the benefits of military 
preparedness, including increased expenditures for the army and 
navy and coordination of both services at the political level, they 
differed over the impact it should have on civil society. As always, 
Hart voiced moderation. He described the impact that war could 
have on American society and came to what might appear a 
surprising conclusion. In the war, he noted, 
is evidence that even a mild militarism has very unfavorable 
effects upon democracy. . . . The joy of American living is the 
right to one's own w a y . .  . . [W]e go to an excess of 
freedom. . . . The yellow journal pushes the right of a free press 
to the point of scurrilousness. Children select their schools and 
- - 
65. Id.; see also Letter from S. Stanwood Menken to Albert Bushnell Hart 
(Sep. 29, 1919) (unpublished material on file with Harvard University Library, 
Albert Bushnell Hart Papers); Response of Albert Bushnell Hart (Sep. 30, 1919) 
(unpublished material on file with Harvard University Library, Albert Bushnell 
Hart Papers). 
66. Letter from Albert Bushnell Hart to Charles Orth (Oct. 11, 1919) 
(unpublished material on file with Harvard University Library, Albert Bushnell 
Hart Papers). 
67. See, e.g., Diary entry of Robert Lee Bullard (Jul. 8, 1928) (unpublished 
material on file with the Library of Congress, Manuscripts Division, Robert Lee 
Bullard Papers) ("The NSL has put a recent plank on its platform, 'opposition to 
government ownership or operations of railroads, telephones and other public 
utilities.' I have now the duty of making it strong and of effect."); Diary entry of 
Robert Lee Bullard (June 30,1937) (unpublished material on !Ye with the Library of 
Congress, Manuscripts Division, Robert Lee Bullard Papers); Diary entry of Robert 
Lee Bullard (Jul. 30, 1938) (unpublished material on file with the Library of 
Congress, Manuscripts Division, Robert Lee Bullard Papers) ("Bitter politics 
continue over New Deal policies and measures, with growing belief that these are 
becoming Communistic."). 
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colleges, their friends and amusements. The trade in poisonous 
drugs is just now coming under regulation. Yet there is no 
genuine American who does not feel that these extravagances 
are to be endured, if necessary, to keep the two pearls of great 
price-freedom of body from the control of another person, and 
the freedom of the soul to see and to describe things as they 
68 
are. 
This passage raises some interesting issues. First, Hart pursued 
his pearls-even for unpopular causes. Among other things, he 
worked strenuously to support the rights of African-Americans to 
vote and to get an ed~cation.~' Second, the passage illuminates his 
personal, even arbitrary, definition of excessive freedom. He 
implies that .actual scurrilousness would take the press beyond its 
guaranteed freedom.70 ~h~ notion that children might choose their 
own schools and friends would rank low on most lists of the 
excesses of democracy. Advocating control of "poisonous drugs" 
seems a paradoxical way to argue that democracy lets one do with 
one's body what one wishes. And third, the conclusion of the 
passage seems to come from nowhere: 
War is the negative and denial of freedom. All modern wars 
rest upon the universal legal principle that it is the right of the 
state to command the service of any or all of its sons. The free 
American may be, indeed ought to be, compelled to undergo 
some military training.71 
This argument implies a link between universal military training 
and effective strategic deterrence, which seems a large leap of 
argumentative faith. Hart also later claimed that universal military 
training would drive down domestic crime.72 
68. Albert Bushnell Hart, The War and Democracy, in PROBLEMS OF 
READJUSTMENT AFTER THE WAR, 15-16 (1915). 
69. See Morison, supra note 55, at 47. 
70. This notion was supported during the American participation in World War 
I. Congress passed its now-notorious Sedition Act (1918) to limit "disloyal 
utterances" in addition to the Espionage Act of 1917. These acts were contested in 
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (applying the "clear and present danger" 
test to uphold the constitutionality of the Espionage Act), Frohwerk v. United States, 
249 U.S. 204 (1919), Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919), and Abrams v. United 
States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (applying the bad tendency test to uphold the 
constitutionality of the Sedition Act); see also HARRY N .  SCHREIBER, THE WILSON 
ADMINISTRATION AND CIVIL LIBERTIES, 1917-1921 (1960). 
71. ' Hart, supra note 68, at 16. 
72. See Hart's comments before the Congress for Constructive Patriotism in 
Washington, D.C., Dec. 2527,1917; see also EDWARDS, supra note 31, at 49. 
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If Hart was ambivalent about the impact of a preparedness 
movement on American democracy, other leaders displayed fewer 
doubts and greater enthusiasm. Honorary NSL Vice President 
Theodore Roosevelt vigorously argued before the League's annual 
meeting: 
We need, more than anything else in the country, thoroughgoing 
Americanism,-for unless we are Americans and nothing else, 
we are not a nation at all- and thoroughgoing preparedness in 
time of peace against war,-for if we are not thus prepared, we 
shall remain a nation only until some more virile nation finds it 
worth while to conquer us. The work of preparedness-spiritual 
and material, civil, industrial, and military-and the work of 
Americanization are simply the two paramount phases or 
elements of the work of constructive patriotism which your 
Congress has gathered to foster. There can be no real 
preparedness in this country unless this country is thoroughly 
Americanized; for only a patriotic people will be prepared; and 
there can be no deep national feeling for America, until we are 
all of us Americans through and 
This passage illuminates Roosevelt's Darwinian understanding of 
international relations: only the fittest nation survives. Moreover, 
survival depends not only on preparedness in its broadest sense 
("spiritual and material, civil, industrial, and military") but also on 
a nationalist socialization that brooks sympathy for no other culture 
or state. Roosevelt's fervor for war soon overwhelmed his "100% 
Americanism" when he schemed to go behind the back of President 
Wilson to raise a division-if necessary a division of the French or 
Canadian armies. Naturally, Roosevelt viewed this as pursuing an 
American agenda, albeit in a non-American organization. In 
Roosevelt's world, each individual is thoroughly devoted to the 
triumph of his state. Likewise, Elihu Root decried the fact that the 
nation had "reached this condition of indifference and sluggish 
patriotism though decadence. As we have grown rich in material 
things we have grown poor in ~pirit. '"~ While many other NSL 
leaders no doubt shared this view, the nation of immigrants could 
not. 
4. Universal Military Service-Far less controversially, the 
League built support for universal military training under which 
73. 8 LET~ERS OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT 1143 (Elting E. Morison ed. 1954) 
(emphasis added) (quoting Letter of Theodore Roosevelt to S. Stanwood Menken 
(Jan. 10,1917)). 
74. PEARLMAN, supra note 31, at 145 (quoting Elihu Root, Proceedings of the 
Congress of Constructive Patriotism 23). 
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every able man would serve some time on active duty and join in 
some sort of reserve. The original NSL organization included three 
committees led by distinguished and capable citizens. A founding 
member of the foreign policy elite, former Secretary of War Henry 
Stimson chaired the NSL's Army Committee, which advocated a 
Continental-sized service.75 Scientific American editor and navalist 
J. Bernard Walker chaired the Navy Committee, which called for 
creation of the largest navy in the world. Roosevelt expressed 
similar views in a letter to Henry Wise 
We must ultimately organize ourselves, socially and for the 
work of peace, and for self-defense in war, with the 
extraordinary efficiency that Germany has shown, thanks to the 
movement begun in Germany over a century ago.. . . [Alnd 
with this end in view to secure practical preparedness for against 
war by introducing some adaptation of the excellent Swiss 
system of universal and obligatory military service." 
Then he laid out his agenda, one more typical of big-government 
Republicans than of their relatively anti-federal Democratic rivals: 
First we should at once enter upon a comprehensive plan of 
naval construction, which shall at the earliest possible moment 
make us the second naval power of the world. Second, we must 
insist upon the publication by the Government of the plans of 
the General Staff of the Army, so that the people may know 
75. True to his principles, Stimson was sworn into the United States Army on 
May 31, 1917. In his June 1940 commencement address at Yale, former Secretary 
of War and of State Stimson renewed the call for a draft. For his troubles, 
President Franklin Roosevelt asked him to return to service as Secretary of War. 
See HENRY STIMSON & MCGEORGE BUNDY, ON A m v ~  SERVICE IN PEACE AND 
WAR 91, 480-84 (1947). Huntington refers to this moment in a footnote also 
because his argument is that the Neo-Hamiltonian compromise between the 
military ethos and the dominant Jeffersonian liberal tradition had ended in 1920. 
See HUNTINGTON, supra note 13, at 271 n.* ("Neo-Hamiltonism reemerged briefly 
in 1940 and 1941 when Grenville Clark, Stimson, Robert P. Patterson, Elihu Root, 
Jr., and others in the Roosevelt-Root-Wood tradition played a major role in 
stimulating American rearmament and in securing the passage of the Selective 
Service Act of 1940."). This article argues that the Neo-Hamiltonian impulse did 
not die in 1920 and that its resurfacing in 1940 was an important harbinger of the 
national security state. 
76. Henry Wise Wood (1866-1939), son of New York's Civil War era 
"Copperhead" Democrat mayor (Fernando Wood), was an industrialist, poet, and 
political philosopher. See PEARLMAN, supra note 31, at 134-135. 
77. Letter from Theodore Roosevelt to Henry Wise Wood, chair of the 
conference committee on national preparedness (Oct. 30, 1915) (unpublished 
material on file with Columbia University, Manuscripts and Rare Books Library, 
George H. Putnarn Papers, Correspondence Files). Wood also served as executive 
director of the NSL. 
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what their military experts regard as the vital military needs of 
the ~ e ~ u b l i c . ~ '  
Like most of the League's members and with the exception of the 
division he would command, Roosevelt supported professional 
leadership of a citizen army.79 And like most members, Roosevelt 
preferred a military run by a panel of experts rather than subject to 
a Congress captured by local interests." For all his experience as a 
soldier, author, and statesman, Roosevelt would qualify as one of 
the few such civilian experts. 
5. 100% Americans-The NSL's 100 percent American 
campaign had not waited for Congress to declare war on the 
Central Powers. Socialists, hyphenated Americans, and opponents 
of total mobilization for war were not "100 percent American." 
Roosevelt wrote to Menken, "Citizenship must mean an undivided 
loyalty to America; there can be no citizenship on the 50-50 basis; 
there can be no loyalty half to American and half to Germany, or 
England, or France, or Ireland, or any other co~ntry."~'  Roosevelt's 
strident patriotism was quickly echoed across the nation and 
magnified with the entry into war. German-Americans were 
abused, scorned, and sometimes lynched. Even before U.S. entry 
into the war, however, they suffered. Toying with the idea of 
running for President again early in 1916, Roosevelt was told of 
their opposition. He remarked typically, 
If the German-American vote is solid against me because of the 
position I have taken, then, in my judgment, it shows that the 
German-Americans are solidly against this country. I do not 
believe that it is true of the vast majority of American citizens of 
German birth and descent; but, if it is true, it renders it all the 
more necessary that I should, in the sharpest possible manner, 
wake up real Americans to their danger." 
78. Id. 
79. See EDWARDS, supra note 31, at 46-47; PEARLMAN, supra note 31, at 160. 
80. For an analysis of the impact of rent-seeking local interests of Progressive 
era military strategy, see Peter Trubowitz, Geography and Strategy: The Politics of 
American Naval Expansion, in THE POLITICS OF STRATEGIC ADJUSTMENT, ch. 4, 
(Trubowitz et. al., eds., 1999) (regional interests shaped the composition and thus the 
strategy of the new navy that emerged in the late nineteenth century). 
81. 8 THE LETTERS OFTHEODORE ROOSEVELT, supra note 73, at 1144 (quoting 
Letter from Theodore Roosevelt to S. Stanwood Menken (Jan. 10,1917)). For an 
reprise of these sentiments, see Hermann Hagedorn's panegyric, THE BUGLE THAT 
WOKE AMERICA: SAGA OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT'S LAST BA~TLE FOR HIS 
COUNTRY (1940). 
82. 8 IkE LETTERS OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT, supra note 73, at 1016 (quoting 
Letter from Theodore Roosevelt to Gifford Pinchot (Feb. 8,1916)). For his decision 
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In the end, Roosevelt rejected a run. 
Three days before the election of 1916, Wilson announced his 
own preparedness program in a speech at the Manhattan Club. He 
called for speeding up naval construction and strengthening the 
National Guard. Proposing only a half-hearted acceleration, this 
speech failed to generate support among many Republicans - with 
the notable exceptions of Stimson and Root. Roosevelt wrote to 
his old friend Henry Cabot Lodge, "Root and Stimson by their 
letters to the Security League have started Wilson on his tour with 
their endor~ernent."~' Even such mild measures, however, put 
Wilson out in front of many of his more pacifistic Democratic 
colleagues-among them former Secretary of State William 
Jennings Bryan, Speaker of the House James Beauchamp "Champ" 
Clark, Representative Claude Kitchen, and members of the 
American Union Against Mil i tar i~m.~~ 
Throughout its existence and particularly in the two and a half 
years before the U.S. declaration of war, the NSL called for some 
form of universal military training, believing in its strategic and 
moral value. Thus the leaders and members of the NSL cultivated 
manly martial vigor. Henry Wise Wood attributed the nation's 
decline to a "wave of effemina~y."~~ The NSL supported 
not to run, see id. (May-June 1916 letters from Roosevelt); see also Letter from 
Albert Bushnell Hart to Theodore Roosevelt (June, 15,1916) (unpublished material 
on f i e  with Harvard University Library, Albert Bushnell Hart Papers). 
83. 8 THE LETTERS OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT, supra note 73, at 1005-07 
(quoting Letter from Theodore Roosevelt to Henry Cabot Lodge (Jan. 26,1916)). 
84. See id. at 978; see also CWERS, supra note 31, at 114. 
85. For Wood's comments, see EDWARDS, supra note 31, at 57. For some 
interesting observations of the relationship between military, manliness, and the 
integrity of society, see KRISTIN L. HOGANSON, FIGHTING FOR AMERICAN 
MANHOOD: HOW GENDER POLITICS PROVOKED THE SPANISH-AMERICAN A D 
PHILIPPINE-AMERICAN WARS (1998); Thomas Ricks, Separation Anxiety, WALL ST. 
J., Jul. 27, 1995, at 1 ff: And also see the relevant historical literature of this 
movement, including foremost CHAMBERS, supra, note 31. For a comparison with 
the British model, see some important 'recent works, including foremost R.J.Q. 
ADAMS & PHILIP . PIORIER, THE CONSCRIPTION CONTROVERSY IN GREAT BRITAIN, 
1900-1918 (1987) which examines Lord Roberts' National Service League. The 
British League was established to press for compulsory drill for boys and service for 
young men. See id. at 10. The most famous soldier living in Britain, Lord Roberts 
assumed the presidency of the National Service League in December 1905, 
immediately granting it tremendous prestige. See id. at 11. Adams and Piorier 
believe that the League took its model from the British Navy League, the Imperial 
Maritime League, and the National Defense Association. See id. at 245-55 n.27. 
While the League expressed concern about the possibility of the nation being 
overrun in an invasion, its leaders also hoped that drill and service would promote a 
distinct brand of young men and of patriotism. One of its leaders wrote in 1907 that 
it was "one of the most powerful moral agencies at our command." Id. at 20. The 
League had 10,000 members in 1907, 32,000 in 1909, 62,000 a year later, and some 
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"compulsory military training and service, wholly under national 
control, for all physically fit male citizens."86 Henry L. Stimson 
wrote to Putnam: 
It is needless to tell you that I am a strong believer in the 
principle of universal training and service in this country, both 
as a military necessity and as a highly important part of our 
education for civil duties.. . . I do not think that we shall ever 
get universal service without universal training. It is only when 
people realize that when all citizens, rich and poor alike, are 
equally bearing their share of the duty as well as deriving their 
share of the benefit of the physical training and lessons of 
discipline that go with it, that they will accept the scheme as a 
part of their American c i t i zen~hi~ .~ '  
This type of service would have at least three unintended but 
powerful secondary effects. First, the power, scope, and size of the 
federal government would have to increase tremendously in order 
to manage, train, and provision millions of men in uniform. New 
management skills, physical infrastructures, and doctrine would be 
required." 
Second, the government would have to decide who was fit. 
This inevitably meant defining categories typical of Progressive era 
scientific management. The definition of fitness normally included 
physical characteristics such as height, strength, and number of 
original teeth. The armed forces had also initiated mass use of 
psychologist Alfred Binet's intelligence tests as improved by Lewis 
Terman of Stanford University. The Stanford-Binet tests gained in 
270,000 members by the outbreak of war. See id. at 17. This League led to a new 
Ministry of National Service in August 1917. See id. I suspect that the naming of the 
American National Security League owed something also to the fact that there were 
already Navy and Army Leagues, giving the NSL a certain immediate familiarity and 
gravitas. 
Additional literature includes PETER SIMKINS, KITCHENER'S ARMY: THE 
RAISING OFTHE NEW ARMY, 1914-1916 (1988), Nicoletta Gullacci, Women and the 
Ideology of War: Recruitment, Propaganda, and the Mobilization of Public 
Opinion in Britain, 1914-1918 (1993) (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation) (on file 
with the University of California, Berkeley), and NANCY BRISTOW, MAKING MEN 
MORAL: SOCIAL ENGINEERING DURING THE GREAT WAR (1996). 
86. Letter from Henry Stimson to George Haven Putnam (Nov. 15, 1916) 
(unpublished material on file with Columbia University, Manuscripts and Rare 
Books Library, George Haven Putnam Papers). 
87. Id. For membership numbers, see CHAMBERS, supra note 31, at 81. 
88. See KENNEDY, OVER HERE, supra note 31; EDWARD M. COFFMAN, THE 
WAR TO END ALL WARS (1968) for this buildup; see also AN ADMIRAL'S YARN: THE 
AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF HARRIS LANING (Mark R. Shulman, et. al. eds. 1999) (detailing 
the experience of undertaking the naval personnel buildup from the perspective of 
the acting Chief of the Bureau of Personnel). 
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popularity, and soon most of American youth had to take them 
regularly. This army innovation eventually altered the way the 
nation understood intelligence. Fitness came quickly also to 
include some strict categories of moral suitability, triggering 
campaigns to drive out religious or political dissenters, sexual 
"deviants," those who frequented prostitutes, and people convicted 
of crimes who had completed their punishment -now a class called 
 criminal^."^^ The unfit did not include pacifists, who could be 
coerced into service because national security overrode their 
personal qualms. Each of the categories led to moral or reform 
campaigns. Whatever personal views one may have of those who 
were deemed unfit, the fact remains that the government for the 
first time formally defined individual fitness for participation in a 
political process. 
Finally, universal military training and service would alter the 
strategic dynamic not only in the western hemisphere but among 
the great  power^.^ Again, whatever one's view of America's role in 
the world, universal military training would undoubtedly alter it by 
changing regional and global balances of power. Like Stimson, 
most of those encouraging compulsory service believed that 
additional manpower would make the nation more secure. 
Moreover, they believed that the moral qualities derived from 
military service would imbue a sense of honor, integrity, and duty in 
America's youth and consequently in a nation whose vigor was 
daily being sapped by "the love of soft-living."91 Additionally, the 
League hoped to instill "100% Americanism" in a way that did not 
require military drill; it promoted a plan to employ civilian 
conscripts in the construction of great public works on the rationale 
that it would cultivate discipline and Americanism. This plan 
89. Although prostitution or "white slavery" was never politically popular within 
the Progressive movement, the Army under the direction of President Wilson 
undertook its eradication virtually an unprecedented move in the history of war. See 
KENNEDY, OVER HERE, supra note 31, at 186-187. Kennedy cites American 
Expeditionary Forces pamphlets that asked, "How could you look the flag in the 
face, if you were dirty with gonorrhea?" and encouraged avoiding any "potentially 
infectious liaison." Id. This was also the era of the first mass efforts to drive 
homosexuals out of the armed forces. See RANDY SHILTS, CONDUCT UNBECOMING: 
LESBIANS AND GAYS IN THE U.S. MILITARY 16 (1993). For persecution of political or 
religious dissenters, see KENNEDY, OVER HERE, supra note 31, at 146-167. 
90. This article does not attempt to provide a comprehensive view of the 
universal military training and service movement. For one important and expansive 
interpretation, see CHAMBERS, supra note31 (particularly chapter 3). 
91. 8 THE LE-ITERS OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT, supra note 73, at 1144 ("soft- 
living" is quoted from a letter of Theodore Roosevelt to S. Stanwood Menken (Jan. 
10,1917)). 
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would also produce a national highway system to foster interstate 
commerce and national unity in peacetime and speed the 
movement of troops in a national emergency." 
Once Congress declared war, large-scale conscription effect- 
ively overtook the cause of universal military training, thus robbing 
the NSL of the most tangible and democratic item on its agenda. 
From then on, the League turned increasingly to more elitist 
reforms such as increasing the power of experts to insulate decision- 
making from the electorate. The League's leaders tried to throw 
themselves into supporting the draft by distributing uncounted 
pamphlets and waking myriad speeches, but the government's own 
propagandists were eminently successful and did not need the 
NSL's help.93 Nevertheless, among the nearly two hundred NSL 
pamphlets listed for the investigative subcommittee in 1918, scores 
addressed military manpower issues. And the League could not 
credibly complain that President Wilson was failing to fight a 
"scientific war." According to a leading historian of the progressive 
movement, "Like a figure out of progressive theory, the President 
embarked with a handful of associates and a large retinue of expert 
assistants, the specialists whose particular, scientific knowledge 
would fill out his dream of world peace."94 The League's agenda 
called for increased defense expenditures as established by 
"experts," rather than by a Congress subject to a variety of political 
influences that the League thought' inappropriate to such a critical 
set of issues. It called also for multi-year budgets for military and 
92. Along with the fledgling American Automobile Association, the NSL was 
the leading exponent of this innovation. See H.R. 3667,64th Cong. (1915) ("A BILL 
To acquire, construct, and maintain a national defense highway; to provide 
employment for citizens of the United States, and to physically and mentally educate 
them for defense."); see also Letter from Congressman William D. Stephen to 
George Haven Putman (10-CA, Los Angeles) (unpublished material on file with 
Columbia University, Manuscripts and Rare Books Library, George Haven Putnam 
Papers) (explaining H.R. 3667, that the highway system will be 10,000 miles long and 
employ 100,000 citizens in good times and 'several times that number in 'hard times' 
and that "the employment of new men periodically, will greatly add to our trained 
reserves." ). 
Among those convinced was Army Captain Dwight David Eisenhower. In 
1919 Eisenhower crossed the country in an Army convoy and saw the need to 
improve the interstate highway system. In 1954, "as a part of his overall Cold War 
program" President Eisenhower initiated the political maneuvers that eventually 
created the system that bears his name-the largest public works project in U.S. 
history. STEPHEN AMBROSE, 2 EISENHOWER: THE PRESIDENT 250-251 (1984). 
93. The history of conscription is well documented elsewhere. See J. GARRY 
CLIFFORD & SAMUEL R. SPENCER, JR., THE FIRST PEACETIME DRAFT (1986); 
CHAMBERS, supra note 31. For a list of the NSL pamphlets, see Hearing Before, 
supra note 30, at 249-251. 
94. WIEBE, supra note 19, at 273. 
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other security programs and for considerably greater coordination 
between the military services to minimize redundancy. This 
cooperation would take place continually and at the highest levels, 
much as it does in today's joint Department of Defense. 
Besides these defense-oriented proposals, the League called 
for a variety of domestic measures designed to ensure that each 
American fully supported the state and worked to strengthen its 
security. Hart, who believed that universal use of English was 
critical to building a strong American nation, proposed a domestic 
agenda that would, perhaps unintentionally, also strengthen the 
state. 
Another service that the League can confer is to stimulate 
Americanization by aiding in educating the foreign language 
speaking communities which have been formed within our 
borders. No public or private schools ought to be allowed to 
educate in any racial language except English. Perhaps it will be 
necessary to extend this to church services and newspapers in 
foreign languages, though here there is the almost insur- 
mountable difficulty that the formal services of the Roman 
Catholic Church are in Latin as they have been for ages. 
Certainly something can be done to limit the suffrage all over 
the country to those who can read and write English, not merely 
a few stock phrases and sign their name, but can actually 
communicate with people in the ordinary daily life. . . . Any 
adult immigrant who comes to this country and is found three 
years thereafter unable to use English for the ordinary 
communications of life should be repatriated.95 
The English-only position was popular only as long as war raised 
the possibility of subversion. After the peace, it dropped from the 
political agenda for over half a century. 
By the end of the war, the NSL had publicly proposed and 
advocated: a consolidated defense department; national security 
coordination by professionals instead of a politically responsive 
Congress; joint military purchasing; a national natural resources 
board; universal conscription; construction of a national highway 
system; and English-only requirements for citizenship and 
residency. 
95. Letter from Albert Bushnell Hart to Charles D. Orth (Oct. 11, 1919) 
(unpublished material on file with Hanard University Library, Albert Bushnell Hart 
Papers). 
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111. The Fall of the League 
November 1918 brought the end of the NSL as a vibrant 
institution. With the Armistice, all went quiet on the Western 
front. On the home front, the NSL meddled in Congressional 
elections, earning the enmity of some powerful players. During the 
election campaigns, the League tried to help elect a Congress that 
was "100% American." The NSL polled every representative on 
his or her votes for certain preparedness measures it considered 
touchstones of patriotism. Those who voted "wrong" suffered the 
massive directed mailing and mudslinging campaigns of the NSL. 
To more cautious observers, most of these votes showed nothing 
about a member's patriotism or even his position on preparedness. 
Yet to a League blithely shooting from the hip, they were critical 
votes. The League attacked dozens of members. The first woman 
elected to Congress had dared vote against the declaration of war; 
pacifist Jeannette Rankin suffered NSL wrath and lost her seat.96 
The NSL's efforts also helped drive New York's Lower East Side 
representative, Socialist Meyer London, out of the House; the 
League's efforts seemed decisive, as London lost a third term by a 
mere 827 votes.97 Paradoxically, the League appears to have helped 
bring Socialist Victor Berger of Milwaukee to victory by con- 
tributing to the defeat of his anti-war ~pponent .~ '  The Democrats 
lost control of the House. During the brief lame-duck session, 
Speaker Clark appointed a special investigative sub-committee 
composed mostly of those deemed less than "100 percent" loyal. 
Not surprisingly, this committee took an unfriendly view of the 
League's leaders. After weeks of hearings on Capitol Hill and at 
the League's New York headquarters, the committee found that the 
group had violated the Federal Corrupt Practices Act.99 Lacking 
96. Rankin was reelected by isolationist Montana in 1940, and she cast the sole 
"nay" vote on the decision to declare war in December 1941. 
97. See PEARLMAN, supra note 31, at 161. 
98. See Hearing Before, supra note 30, at 427. Congress then refused to seat 
Berger. 
99. In the era before Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), the Federal Corrupt 
Practices Act of 1925 (FCPA) extended the reach of the Tillman Act of 1907 which 
had been part of President Theodore Roosevelt's original program to limit the 
influence of corporations on the political process. See Kirk J. Nahra, Political Pam'es 
and the Campaign Finance Laws: Dilemmas, Concerns and Opportunities, 56 
FORDHAM L. REV. 53,59 n.35,60 n.45 (1987) ("As the historical background [of the 
Tillman Act] indicates, its aim was not merely to prevent the subversion of the 
integrity of the electoral process. Its underlying philosophy was to sustain the active, 
alert responsibility of the individual citizens in a democracy for the wise conduct of 
government.") (citing United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567, 575 (1957)); see also 
David Rocklin, Note and Comment, Non-Profit Corporate Political Speech, 63 CHI.- 
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effective leadership and divided by bitter internal disputes over the 
Treaty of Paris, the League soon fell into disrepute. 
The diminished League focused increasingly on domestic 
security measures. In 1920, the League clamored for an even more 
repressive and less representative state, proposing to combat 
radicals at home though education campaigns designed to "fight 
Bolshevism and preach Americanism" and teach 100% American- 
ism to immigrants and children, "urging universal military training 
as a necessity for National Defense and spreading knowledge of its 
mental and physical benefits and democratizing influence."'" The 
NSL also advocated a "National Budget" that centralized all 
spending decisions in the hands of experts in Washington. In 1921, 
its new president, Charles Orth, opened a campaign to drive 
radicals from American colleges and univer~ities.'~' This agenda 
went only slightly further than that of a few years before, and yet 
with its new strident tone it could well have been drafted by 
Mussolini's contemporary American cousin. 
After several years of the NSL's drift to the right, a more 
centrist group under Menken retook control. The League limped 
along for over two decades without serious political impact. At one 
point, former assistant secretary of the navy Franklin D. Roosevelt 
even served as a vice president, as the League again attempted to 
focus on bolstering national defense.'02 The nation, however, had 
little taste for defense issues. Congress decimated the Army and 
reduced the Navy to levels below those allowed by the Washington 
Treaty. The national security movement had lost its drive. In 1925 
Menken decided to give more attention to his legal practice, turning 
over the presidency to Lt. Gen. Robert Lee Bullard, recently 
retired commander of the U.S. Second Army. Under Bullard, who 
KENT. L. REV. 159, 161 (1987) for more legislative history, including the one test 
case of the rule's constitutionality, United States v. U.S. Brewers' Association, 239 F. 
163 (W.D. Pa. 1916) (Congress may limit corporate speech in federal elections). 
The FCPA, ch. 368, $9 368 301-19, 43 Stat. 1070 (1925) (current version 
codified at 2 U.S.C. $ 441b (1994)) banned "any kind of contribution by a 
corporation in connection with federal elections." Rocklin, supra, at 161. 
100. National Security League Flyer (June 1920) (on file with Harvard 
University Library, Albert Bushnell Hart Papers); see also the conservative ALB. 
EVENING J., Sept. 23, 1923, citing with approbation the League's anti-communist, 
anti-labor works. 
101. See EDWARDS, supra note 31, at 132. 
102. See Minutes of the National Security League Board of Directors (Apr. 2, 
1924) (unpublished material on file with Haward University Library, Albert 
Bushnell Hart Papers); see also Letter from S. Stanwood Menken to Albert Bushnell 
Hart (Dec. 22,1924) (on file with Harvard University Library, Albert Bushnell Hart 
Papers). 
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continued as president until 1942, the organization lacked initiative, 
internal political consensus or external support, funds, or influence. 
Throughout the twenties and thirties, Bullard spoke and wrote 
about the importance of universal military training, the need for a 
larger defense budget, and the growing communist threat- 
apparently without effect. In 1930 he had even cast Menken from 
the membership rolls because the former president publicly 
supported recognition of the Soviet Union. This was too much for 
the anti-communist general. 
The League went bankrupt in 1939. The general burned most 
of its records. After losing its offices in 1940, it survived until 1942 
-but only on paper, in Bullard's New York City apartment. On  its 
last day of operation, Bullard summarized the history of the 
League: 
Up to the end of the First World War the League's main 
purpose had been the National Defense and Preparedness. It 
then turned its attention very strongly to the Constitution and 
the upkeep of our system of government and anti-communism 
which had started in Russia. The third one, communism, began 
to play out about four or five years ago when Russia ceased to 
be a communism [sic] and became a dictatorship with, however, 
a plain tendency toward a great freedom for the people. Then 
the League relaxed its efforts against communism. The other 
two matters, the National Defense and the Constitution, have 
kept up to the present and for the last two and a half years 
especially the National Defense. A great deal more could be 
added to this but that has been the League's general work 
through its life of twenty-six years.'03 
The League was overtaken by events. Decades later, even Henry 
Stimson did not consider it important enough to mention in his 
memoirs.'@' Responding to my query in the spring of 1996, 
Stimson's amanuensis and friend, McGeorge Bundy, responded: 
How sorry I am to have to tell you I draw a blank on the 
National Security League. I don't say I never heard of it, 
because I think I did run into its existence somewhere in my 
work with Colonel Stimson. But that's literally all I can tell you. 
I don't recall discussing it with him, or indeed with anyone else 
about it. From this gap I reach the conclusion that neither the 
Colonel nor I thought the subject important enough in his life 
103. Diary entry of Robert Lee Bullard (Aug. 27,1942) (unpublished material on 
file with the Library of Congress, Manuscripts Division, Robert Lee Bullard Papers). 
104. See STIMSON & BUNDY, supra note 75. 
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for us to pursue it then, in the late '40s. But I can't tell you 
more than that because I don't remember any more.'" 
The League had established a discourse and an agenda - and then 
faded from memory. 
IV. National Security After the League 
Notoriously isolationist during the 1920's and thirties, the 
United States pretty much ignored the national security agenda 
which quietly waited for the right moment. When Admiral Isoroko 
Yamamoto shattered the myth of American isolation on December 
7, 1941, national security moved to the fore in political discussion. 
Not long after the end of World War 11, the NSL's agenda had 
resurfaced as the blueprint for the postwar world. 
A. Between the Wars 
In the inter-war period, the idea of national security remained 
largely dormant. On the one hand, domestic security posed several 
pressing political issues, most of which were eventually (if only 
temporarily and partially) resolved in favor of a positive notion of 
liberty. First, the Red Scare of 1918-1919 allowed J. Edgar Hoover 
to reshape the Federal Bureau of Investigation into a national 
police force with jurisdiction over so-called subversive 
organizations. In one notorious set of raids on January 2, 1920, 
federal agents arrested more than 4,000 alleged  communist^.'^ But 
Hoover's power diminished with the return to normalcy, and in the 
1920's and thirties it fell far short of the high-water mark it would 
reach in the fifties.lm Likewise, the defense of First Amendment 
rights intensified.''' The backlash against loss of liberties during the 
war included heightened scrutiny of government efforts to limit free 
speech. In fact, in the struggle for unpopular minorities to be 
heard, First Amendment rights became an independent and highly 
politicized subject of constitutional interpretation, and as such no 
longer merely an item on the national security agenda. As Hart 
105. Letter from McGeorge Bundy to Mark R. Shulman (April 29,1996) (on file 
with the author). 
106. See MOYNIHAN, supra note 60, at 115. 
107. See WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBERG, THE PERILS OF PROSPERITY, 1914-1932, 
77-83 (1958) (concluding "the 1920's despite their chauvinism and conservatism, 
were hostile to the spirit of the Red Scare."). 
108. Foremost among the defenders, Roger Baldwin founded the National Civil 
Liberties Bureau (later the American Civil Liberties Union) to safeguard civil rights. 
See Richard Gid Powers, Introduction to MOYNIHAN, supra note 60, at 24. 
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had noted during the war, a free press is fundamental to democracy 
and also severely threatened by war: 
One of the triumphs and protections of democratic government 
is the liberty of the press. It has been won by sheer 
determination in the teeth of the fundamental belief of despotic 
governments that it is harmful to them to have people discuss 
what is going on . . . . How is it today? Even in England there is 
no such thing as a free press. Among belligerent powers no 
criticisms are allowed. . . . [In Germany] free thought, public 
discussion the will of the people have lost their meaning.Io9 
Fortunately for the cause, the American Civil Liberties Union and 
other like-minded organizations arose to champion the fourth 
estate in the post-war era. 
Between wars, proposals for a unified defense department 
occasionally surfaced both inside the government and out- to little 
effect. Throughout the twenties, Army Brigadier General William 
"Billy" Mitchell ardently advocated a joint "Department of 
National Defense" composed of the Navy, the Army, and a new Air 
F ~ r c e . " ~  Mitchell's ideas for changing the military, however, were 
too radical for the Army of his day, despite the fact that the 
American Legion and the Army War College sponsored similarly 
ignored studies."' Outside traditional defense circles, the idea was 
heard by few until problems of inter-service rivalry and lack of 
cooperation reappeared during the Second World War. 
B. The Second World War 
In the spring of 1942, Columbia University's long-time 
president Nicholas Murray Butler made a similar proposal in his 
memoirs and also in a letter to his friend President Franklin 
Roosevelt. Referring to his memoirs, he asked the President 
to read page 358-9-60 where I discuss the question of a Single 
Department of National Defense. . . . All sorts of stories 
involving and illustrating this lack of cooperation are in 
circulation. Probably not all of them are true, but they do 
represent a state of public opinion which is increasingly 
important. It appears to be difficult to make some of the 
representatives of the army and navy grasp the fact that 
109. See HART, supra note 68, at 11,13-14. 
110. See National Defense Miscellaneous (1924-1925) (unpublished material on 
file with the Library of Congress, Manuscripts Division, Box 45, William Mitchell 
Papers). 
111. See id. 
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dominance over both of these forces for defense has, under 
present-day conditions, passed to the air force and national 
defense must now be administered as a unit and not as two or 
even three separate units which may fail in full cooperation with 
each other. . . . I do believe that the plan outlined in the pages 
referred to is a sound and convincing one and that now is the 
time to put it into effect. To do so, would add one more to your 
outstanding achievements as the Chief Administrator of our 
people's ~overnment ."~  
The Butler archives do not include a presidential response. Only a 
few months later joint (Army, Navy, Marines, and Army Air Force) 
and combined forces (U.S. and British) launched the largest 
amphibious operation in modern history. Operation TORCH 
signally demonstrated the armed forces' ability to cooperate under 
the worst of circumstances to achieve remarkable success. They 
quickly established a beachhead in North Africa from which the 
Allied forces eventually liberated two continents. For the 
remainder of the war, inter-service cooperation continued on an ad 
hoc basis. 
C. After the War 
In 1945, however, reformers returned to the issues of national 
security. Much had changed over the preceding quarter century, in 
three important areas. First, military roles and missions were 
rethought in light of the gargantous World War I1 campaigns. The 
scope and scale of war had expanded dramatically, as had the 
ability to strike across wide expanses of ocean. The German 
Blitzkrieg and above all the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor had 
shattered many Americans' faith in their nation's invulnerability. 
The conduct of the war and lessons learned from other armed 
forces brought home the critical importance of cooperation among 
land, sea, and air forces. This was as true at the tactical level as at 
the level of grand strategy. Frequently in the Pacific, tactical 
success depended on soldiers fighting alongside marines, with air 
support and naval bombardment.l13 Likewise, grand strategy 
112. Letter from Nicholas Murray Butler to Franklin D.  Roosevelt (May 22, 
1942) (unpublished material on file with Columbia University, Manuscripts and 
Rare Books Library, Nicholas Murray Butler Collection, Presidential 
Correspondence Folder) (the letter is referring to ACROSS THE YEARS (1942)). 
For more on Butler, see ALBERT MARRIN, NICHOLAS MURRAY BUTLER (1976). 
113. For some of the problems this requirement entailed, see CRAIG CAMERON, 
AMERICAN SAMURAI: MYTH,  MAGIN NATION, AND THE CONDUCT OF BA-ITLE IN THE 
FIRST MARINE DIVISION, 1941-1951 C ~ S .  4 , s  (1994). 
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required that General Douglas MacArthur and Admiral Chester 
Nimitz not only divide the Pacific theater of operations but also 
share forces. 
Second, many people in the United States developed a form of 
paranoia that saw fifth column enemies everywhere. Even 
paranoiacs can have real enemies; the Soviet Union started to 
expand its efforts to subvert the United States at home."4 Unlike 
the Red Scare of 1919, however, this fear was seriously grounded. 
Russia had long since fallen to an internal communist revolution, 
and the most populous nation on earth, China, seemed about to 
follow suit. Communist expansion had claimed eastern Europe and 
now menaced the dominoes of Southeast Asia. This fed fears of a 
foreign-inspired internal revolution in the United States. 
Third, the emergence of post-war technology meant that for 
the first time an enemy could strike the continental United States 
catastrophically. The sea-launched surprise attack on Pearl Harbor 
had been sufficient to cause the War and Justice departments to 
imprison thousands of American citizens based merely on their 
ethnic origins. The Supreme Court had approved these extra- 
ordinary violations of civil and human  right^."^ The German 
scientists who designed the V-2 rockets that attacked London in 
1945 had been brought home by the Soviets and the Americans to 
serve their competing rocket development programs. The fire- 
storm bombings of Dresden and Tokyo, and even the nuclear 
explosions at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, barely foreshadowed the 
destructiveness of intercontinental missiles to come. 
These dramatic changes inevitably altered the ways Americans 
looked at defense at home and abroad. The official responses were 
initially temporized, driven more by fear and confusion than by a 
defined national security agenda. But a coherent policy began to 
coalesce in August 1945."~ Secretary of the Navy James V. 
Forrestal, dispirited about the possibility of a peaceful post-war 
114. See MOYNIHAN, supra note 60 (especially ch. 5). 
115. See Korematsu v. U.S., 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (finding constitutional the 
exclusion and curfew imposed upon individuals of Japanese descent living in the 
United States). 
116. The initial Congressionally-sponsored efforts produced a couple of reports 
and unsuccessful bills, but the detailed history of the 1945-1947 origins of the 
National Security Act is found elsewhere. See PAUL Y. HAMMOND, The Unification 
Controversy, in ORGANIZING FOR DEFENSE: THE AMERICAN MILITARY ESTABLISH- 
MENT IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1961); see also Army-Navy Consolidation, in 11 
EDITORIAL RESEARCH REPORTS 239-242 (1945); Maj. Gen. Otto L. Nelson, Jr., 
NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE GENERAL STAFF (1946); Thomas-Hill-Austin Bill, S. 
2044,79th Cong. (1946). 
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world, told a Senate committee, "Our national security can only be 
assured on a very broad and comprehensive front. . . . I am using 
the word 'security' here consistently and continuously, rather than 
'defense.' "I1' Senator Edwin Johnson responded, "I like your 
words, 'national security.' "lI8 Forrestal went on to say, "The 
question of national security is not merely a question of the Army 
and the Navy. We have to take into account our whole potential 
for war, our mines, industry, manpower, research and all the 
activities that go into normal civilian life."11g 
The next month, Ferdinand Eberstadt sent to Forrestal and 
Congress a report advocating the continued existence of individual 
military departments with the addition of a new Department of the 
Air Force. Coordination would take place within a new institution, 
a National Security Council consisting of the President, the three 
service secretaries, and the Secretary of State.Izo This new National 
Security Council (NSC) would direct foreign and military policy 
and supervise the new Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and 
National Security Resources Board (NSRB). An expert Special 
Assistant to the President would direct both the NSC and the 
NSRB.'~' 
117. Hearings on S. 84 and S. 1482 Before the Senate Comm. On Military 
Affairs, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 299, at 108 (1945) (testimony of James Forrestal). 
118. Id. 
119. Note, National Security and the Amended Freedom of Information Act, 85 
YALE L.J. 401,410 (1976); see also THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE: DOCUMENTS ON 
THE ESTABLISHMENT AND ORGANIZATION, 1944-1978 (Alice C. Coles et. al. eds. 
1978); DEMETRIOS CARALEY, THE POLITICS OF MILITARY UNIFICATION (1966); U.S. 
CONGRESS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, S LECT COMMITTEE ON POST-WAR 
MILITARY POLICY, PROPOSAL TO ESTABLISH A SINGLE DEPARTMENT OF ARMED 
FORCES, HEARING BEFORE THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON POST-WAR MILITARY 
POLICY, 78th Cong., 2d Sess, "Robert Lovett Testimony, April 26, 1944," (1944); 
FERDINAND EBERSTADT, UNIFICATION OF THE WAR AND NAVY DEPARTMENTS AND 
POSTWAR ORGANIZATION FOR NATIONAL SECURITY: REPORT TO HON. JAMES 
FORRESTAL, SECRETARY OF NAVY (Senate Comm. on Naval Affairs, 79th Cong., 1st 
Cong., Comm. Print 1545) [hereinafter EBERSTADT REPORT]. 
120. See EBERSTADT REPORT, supra note 119; see also TOWNSHEND HOOPES & 
DOUGLAS BRINKLEY, DRIVEN PATRIOT: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF JAMES FORRESTAL 
321 (1992). 
121. See HOOPES & BRINKLEY, supra note 120, at 321. Forrestal had hopes of 
making these councils resemble those created within the British Cabinet; see 
ARNOLD ROGOW, JAMES FORESTAL: A STUDY IN PERSONALITY, POWER, AND 
POLICY 266 (1963). For the background on the Eberstadt Report, see JEFFERY M. 
DORWART, EBERSTADT AND FORRESTAL (1991). For the text, see the original or the 
more accessible reprinted and abridge edition in the appendix of THE NATIONAL 
SECURITY COUNCIL: JACKSON SUBCOMM~ITEE PAPERS ON POLICY-MAKING AT THE 
PRESIDENTIAL LEVEL (Sen. Henry M. Jackson, ed., 1965). For a cogent discussion of 
the particulars of the proposals, see HAMMOND, supra note 116. Koh argues that the 
NSC in general and the Special Assistant to the President in particular were 
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Forrestal's biographer Jeffery Dorwart notes, "The Eberstadt- 
Forrestal brand of corporatism stressed leadership by an 
organizational elite that mediated between conflicting groups, 
generated public consensus, designed policies and managed 
national affairs."'22 Forrestal's reforms consequently institution- 
alized political ideas from the top down. They ordered complex 
ideas and interests into simple chains of command. Moreover, they 
shared an nearly paranoid (or prescient) fear for the security of the 
nation. Of Forrestal, James F. Byrnes wrote, "He clearly saw. . . 
the menace of communism before his colleagues recognized it. 
Frequently he warned of their plans for world d~mination." '~~ 
Likewise, General Albert Wedemeyer claimed that Forrestal was 
one of the few who "understood the full implications of 
communism."124 
Forrestal also understood the implications for the republic. He 
knew that the country now had to weigh security against liberty. At 
the beginning of 1948, he wrote the New York Times military 
correspondent Hanson W. Baldwin, "It has long been one of my 
strongly held beliefs that the word 'security' ought to be stricken 
from the language and the word 'risk' substituted. . . . The great 
danger in any country is for people to believe that there is anything 
absolute about security. Air power, atomic power, bombs, 
wealth-by itself none of these things can give any security."'25 In 
Baldwin, Forrestal found a kindred spirit who was lecturing 
audiences in March 1947 that only utter destruction of all enemies 
"can completely solve the problem of security and assure 100 
percent national defense in this atomic age."Iz6 Shortly thereafter, 
Forrestal convened the service chiefs at Key West to sort out roles 
and missions for the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and the new Air 
Force. As Forrestal's concern grew about the scope of the Soviet 
threat, he faced serious manpower problems and concluded that the 
-- - - - - 
originally intended by Congress and used by Truman as mere advisors to the 
President. He correctly cautions against reading the strong Nixon, Carter or Reagan 
era NSC's as the original model. See KOH, supra note 6, at 54. 
Eberstadt, a Princeton contemporary of Forrestal served under Col. Henry L. 
Stimson in the 77th Division. See DORWART, supra, at 19. He was gassed at the 
Vesle Defense Sector. See id. 
122. DORWART, supra note 121, at 7. 
123. Rocow, supra note 121, at 321 (quoting Letter from James F. Byrnes to 
Arnold A. Rogow (Mar. 12,1962)). 
124. Id. at 321 (citing ALBERT WEDEMEYER, WEDEMEYER REPORTS! 430 (1958)). 
125. Id. at 283. 
126. Transcript of Hanson Baldwin Lecture (Mar. 25, 1947) (unpublished 
material on file with Yale University, Manuscripts and Archives, Papers of Hanson 
Baldwin, Group no. 54, series 11, "Writings: Addresses, 1940-1967," Box 25). 
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only alternative to universal military training was a revival of the 
draft.Iz7 
In language, policy and spirit, then, Forresta17s program 
resembled nothing so closely as the NSL's platform of a generation 
earlier. He played a central role in shaping the 1947 National 
Security Act which in turn formed the blueprint for the entire U.S. 
defense and domestic security posture of the Cold War. And he 
adopted the NSL agenda wholesale. 
Within two years, Congress had passed and President Truman 
had signed into law most of the measures that the NSL had 
proposed unsuccessfully a generation before."' The National 
Security Act of 1947 created a unified Department of Defense, 
under Forrestal, which included a new service, the Air Force. The 
secretary of this combined department would have his own staff of 
experts to coordinate every aspect of national defense-research 
and development, acquisition and logistics, planning, and even 
decisions to deploy forces. The service chiefs-the Army and Air 
Force Chiefs of Staff, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the 
Marine Corps Commandant-were left with training and tactical 
war-fighting. The Act also created a special assistant to the 
president for national security affairs1''-whose power culminated 
in the Kissinger era (1969-1975) when his influence overshadowed 
that of the Secretaries of State and Defense. The Act established a 
National Security Council composed of civilian and military experts 
to collect information and generate advice for the President.130 The 
council eventually grew so powerful that it could conduct its own 
covert military operations abroad in defiance of Congressional 
mandates (e.g. during the Iran-Contra affair). The Act established 
a centralized intelligence agencyl3l (the CIA) that would not only 
collect and analyze information but also wage paramilitary 
operations shielded from the press and even from Congressional 
oversight. The first agents arrived in Guatemala in March 1947 and 
helped overthrow the government six years later.I3' 
The Act helped to create a national security state that carried 
out some of the most drastic of the domestic security measures. 
127. See Rocow, supra note 121, at 286. 
128. See National Security Act, ch. 343, Title I, Q 101, 61 Stat. 496 (codified as 
amended at 50 U.S.C. Q 402 (1994)). 
129. See 50 U.S.C. Q 402(c). 
130. See id. Q 402(a). 
131. See id. Q 403-1. 
132. See MOYNIHAN, supra note 60, ch. 7 (especially page 181). Other important 
coups or attempted coups were also undertaken outside Congressional oversight: in 
Iran and Cuba. 
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That same CIA and the FBI collected intelligence on American 
citizens. They conducted clandestine operations against American 
citizens at home and abroad. Even at a more benign level, this new 
strong state created a massive interstate highway system much like 
that offered by the NSL half a century before. That network was 
named for the army general officer who institutionalized an idea 
the NSL had sponsored. Eisenhower was, of course, the first new 
president elected after the National Security Act of 1947-a fitting 
choice of the man to lead the nation into the new era. The 
Department of Defense and the CIA eventually won such large 
budgets that they could shape civilian research, development, and 
even education in science-at first in rocketry and atomic energy, 
but soon in biology, health sciences, non-atomic physics, and 
engineering-and then in many of the social sciences, especially 
through massive financial support for the fields of Soviet and China 
studies and psychology. In short, in the name of national security, 
the state intervened in nearly every sector of the productive 
economy. 
While the National Security League was ahead of its time in its 
prescriptions for domestic and international security, the horrors of 
the Second World War so dramatically changed the U.S. domestic 
political landscape that the nation was ready to adopt most of the 
NSL's prescriptions for defense-at home and abroad. The 
Jeffersonian tradition in American military policy was dead. The 
Neo-Hamiltonian vision of domestic security reshaped the United 
States into a national security state, in which the distinction 
between war and peacetime had been eroded in the new paradigm 
of a Cold War. 
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